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ABSTRACT
IS THERE A PLACE FOR SEXUAL DIFFERENCE IN ERNESTO
SPINELLI’S EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY? AN
IRIGARAYAN RESPONSE TO THE WORK OF ERNESTO SPINELLI

By
Aloysius Joseph
December 2007

Dissertation supervised by Suzanne Barnard, Ph.D.
My critique begins with the philosopher-psychoanalyst Luce
Irigaray’s claim that all inter-subjective relations are subtended by
sexual difference, and that forgetting this is ignoring a foundational
aspect of human relations. For Irigaray, sexual difference is not
mediated by biology or some ontological difference that culture
identifies as “man” or “woman,” but a particular relation to the body
and to language that structures inter-subjectivity. I draw from the
work of Ernesto Spinelli, as he is a contemporary scholar-practitioner
of existential phenomenological psychology who is particularly attuned
to the constitution of inter-subjectivity in therapeutic praxis. I began
with Spinelli’s critique of contemporary psychotherapy as “an ally of
dominant cultural assumptions” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 18). Using
Irigaray’s psychoanalytic and deconstructive reading of Western
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metaphysics, I demonstrate that Spinelli’s theory and practice actually
reinforce certain cultural assumptions concerning sexual difference.
This blind spot in his praxis prevents Spinelli from realizing certain
inter-subjective possibilities in his work with clients; namely, the
possibilities afforded by articulating a sexually specific other. I arrived
at this conclusion based on my analysis of his theory and practice visà-vis an Irigarayan understanding of sexual difference. My analysis
showed that he fails to listen to the sexuate nature of embodiment in
his therapeutic praxis. Using Irigaray, I suggest that Spinelli’s
existential psychotherapy can benefit from paying attention to a
perceptual and a sensory economy in therapy that is rooted in the
client’s sexuate body and history. Such a nuanced attunement will
allow the therapist to look for creative ways to “spatialize perception
and make time simultaneous” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 155) in therapy. I
propose that by paying attention to a different economy of language
subtended by an Irigarayan understanding of sexual difference,
Spinelli’s version of existential psychotherapy will not only be
revitalized, but will also continue to challenge the cultural
assumptions of our time.
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Chapter 1
The question of sexual difference
Sexual difference is probably the issue in our
time which could be our ‘salvation’ if we
thought it through.
- Luce Irigaray,
An Ethics of Sexual Difference, p. 5

1.1 Introduction
In a report on the film industry, titled “The Princess Paradox,”
James Poniewozik (Time, April 5, 2004) points out, “Hollywood’s
newest Cinderella stories seek to inject some feminist messages into
the age-old fantasy” (p. 72) of every girl’s desire to be a princess.
Poniewozik’s observations are based on movies like The Prince and Me
(Martha Coolidge, 2004), Ella Enchanted (Tommy Haver, 2004), Shrek
2 (Andrew Adamson & Kelly Asbury, 2004), and A Cinderella Story
(Mark Rosman, 2004). He defines the celluloid Cinderella in the
following manner:
[T]o succeed on both the feminist and the fantasy
level, the new Cinderella has developed rules and
conventions as strict as a Joseph Campbell
template. She should be pretty, but in a classpresident way, not a head-cheerleader way. She
should be able to stand up for herself (recall the
Crouching Tiger moves of Shrek’s Princess Fiona).
She must be socially conscious – a result, says Meg
Cabot, author of the Princess Diaries books, of
Princess Diana’s charitable work. And she should
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above all not want to be a princess – at least until
she changes her mind. In Diaries, Prince and Ella,
it’s not the girl who must prove herself worthy of
princesshood; princesshood must prove itself
worthy of the girl…. You just need a feisty girl, a
prophylactic dose of skepticism and a fabulous ball
gown – about which no ambivalence is necessary.
(2004, p. 74)
The injection of feminist messages into the age-old fantasy/ideal of
girls becoming princesses is not, it seems to me, a paradox but simply
a clever and opportunistic reworking of the age-old patriarchal fantasy
of what a girl should become: a princess. This reworked fantasy
integrates qualities such as equality, beauty, and social consciousness
into the process of becoming a princess, with the condition that
Cinderella still falls in love with a man and goes to the ball. This
strategy of simply decorating the patriarchal ideal of
woman/femininity with a few feminist accessories not only works via
its seductive appeal for many girls and women, but also because the
roles played by women in Hollywood’s new Cinderella stories, are not
(as Jacobson, a top Disney executive observes) “toxic or repellent to
men” (Poniewozik, 2004, p. 74). For example, women are portrayed as
powerful but willing to forfeit their power to reap the rewards of
traditional femininity. Both Poniewozik and Jacobson’s observations
point to the reality of patriarchal fantasies continuing to haunt and
delimit what constitutes woman.
Although overlooked by many in psychology, the influence of the
media on cultural values and norms associated with femininity cannot
and should not be ignored. The media influences cultural practices by
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incorporating patriarchal ideals into the images of femininity; it
additionally influences the images of men that are offered up to
women as “desirous,” and the heterosexual, “masculine” desire from
which women are encouraged to see and experience themselves.
Because these images have persisted to varying degrees over time, the
underlying structure of phallocentrism appears to remain
unchallenged in many important ways.

1.2 Phallocentrism and sexual difference
Phallocentrism can be understood as the use of one particular
model of subjectivity – the male subject – as the norm by which “all
others are positively or negatively defined” (Grosz, 1989, p. 105). The
masculine as the central term defines meaning and social relations.
So, for instance, difference within social relations is understood in
male or phallic terms. In this phallocentric economy, women for
example, are seen as lesser than men (“penis envy”) and are seen to
experience a lesser or ineffective way of knowing (“they are emotional”)
than men. Because patriarchal ideals and fantasies remain
unchallenged within a phallocentric structure, the question of sexual
difference – in other words, the acknowledgment of two sexes, two
bodies, two forms of desire, and two ways of knowing – gets eclipsed.
By the use of the word, “eclipsed,” I am drawing from the literary
meaning of the term as used to describe the astronomical event that
happens when one celestial object moves into the shadow of the other.
The overshadowed object does not cease to exist, but is hidden from
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view. When sexual difference is understood in phallocentric terms, the
term “woman” becomes secondary, marginalized, eclipsed. In the
absence of a non-phallic understanding of sexual difference (difference
understood as pure difference, difference not in relation to a pre-given
norm), what it means to become woman continues to be measured
against a “neutral” (gendered masculine) subject. As a result, the
opportunity to rethink the former on its own terms becomes forfeited.
The sad consequence is that the story of what it means to be woman
continues to be rewritten as “his-story.” One of the most important
“his-torical” influences in the Western philosophical legacy inherited
by modern psychology is the work of Renè Descartes. In the following
section, I will address the link between the Cartesian legacy and
sexual difference.

1.3 Cartesian legacy and sexual difference
The term “Cartesian” denotes certain important elements of the
modern philosophy of Renè Descartes, particularly those arguments
he deploys towards reconciling the philosophical problem of the
subject’s apprehension of the object. My interpretation of Descartes’
philosophy is influenced by the work of existential phenomenologist
Hans Cohn (1997). In his book, Existential Thought and Therapeutic
Practice: An Introduction to Existential Psychotherapy (1997), he
succinctly outlines the Cartesian legacy. Descartes employed a
method of radical doubt; that is, he systematically doubted everything
in the world. His aim was to arrive at something that was absolutely
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certain, the existence of which could not be doubted, in order to build
a reliable system of knowledge. Through this method, he arrived at
one and only one thing that could not be doubted: his own thinking.
This conclusion is encapsulated in his statement, “Cogito ergo sum” (I
think therefore I am), where the cogito is consciousness, self, the
thinking thing (res cogitans). As the cogito needs nothing else to exist,
the body (res extensa) becomes expendable and superfluous.
By separating the mind from the body, Descartes established
the ground for a reliable system of knowledge; however, Western
metaphysics also paid a significant price with the separation of the
mind from the body. This means that anything that is other to the
cogito suffers the same fate; that is, while the cogito and all that it
stands for is privileged, anything other than the cogito suffers the fate
of becoming marginalized.
In her book, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism,
Elizabeth Grosz (1994) discusses the price paid by the body in
Western metaphysics as a consequence of the privileging of the mind
over the body. She observes, “The body either is understood in terms
of organic and instrumental functioning in the natural sciences or is
posited as merely extended, merely physical, an object like any other
in the humanities and social sciences” (p. 8). While the reduction of
the body to the position of an object is, in and of itself, philosophically
problematic, it also impacts the status of whatever else gets
represented by the body. Within the Cartesian economy, the subject’s
relation to the body becomes instrumental; the body serves as a
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conduit or vessel for the subject in its various projects. In its role as
conduit, the body is constituted as a passively resistant object which
requires animation for the subject’s projects; its constitutive role in
the process of knowing is elided.
The Cartesian split also carries implications for sexual
difference. This is so because “woman” and the feminine have been
associated with the body and embodiment since the beginning of
Ancient Greek philosophy. Philosopher and psychoanalyst Luce
Irigaray (1985a) critiques Descartes’ treatment of the body as res
extensa as yet another installment in this philosophical compulsion
toward repetition of “the same.” It should be noted that the Cartesian
economy of mind-body relations is in line with the PlatonicAugustinian tradition of aligning “higher” functions to the “soul” and
the “lower” functions to the “body” and that by subjugating the latter
to the former, sameness and stability was insured.
Irigaray addresses Descartes’ work from the perspective of
subjectivity vis-à-vis sexual difference. Pointing out the many
consequences of what it means to be woman within the Cartesian
framework, she notes, “The ‘I’ thinks, therefore this thing, this body
that is also nature, that is still the mother, becomes an extension of
the ‘I’s disposal for analytical investigations, scientific projections, the
regulated exercise of the imaginary, the utilitarian practice of
technique” (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 186). The body’s association with
nature not only within the Cartesian framework, but also within
certain interpretations of Freud, and the body’s association with the
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mother (as being more corporeal, more natural because of her link to
reproduction and biology), continue to justify social inscriptions of
women as objects to be used, controlled and/or domesticated. Within
this Cartesian metaphysical structure, “woman” belongs to the side of
the “other” – disposable, expendable and superfluous – while “man”
takes the subject position as the cogito – certain, necessary and
indispensable. Grosz (1994), as well, notes the close parallel between
the Cartesian split of the mind and body and the male/female
opposition:
The male/female opposition has been closely allied
with the mind/body opposition. Typically,
femininity is represented (either explicitly or
implicitly) in one of two ways in this cross-pairing of
oppositions: either mind is rendered equivalent to
the masculine and body equivalent to the feminine
(thus ruling out women a priori as possible subjects
of knowledge, or philosophers) or each sex is
attributed its own form of corporeality. (p. 14)
The link of the female with the body comes with a price for
women: loss of subjectivity and reduction to the position of the object.
Within such an economy, when women are linked to their bodies,
what it means to be woman gets coded in biological terms, which in
turn restricts her role within the social and economic orders. For
example, when women are seen as naturally linked to reproduction
and maternity and/or assumed to be prone to “hormonal”
irregularities, their suitability for roles that are thought above all to
require “rational judgment” and authoritative presence (e.g. the
Presidency, or the Head of the Armed Services) is rendered suspect.
Thus, the reduction of women to the position of objects and, hence,
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the “objectifying” representations that emerge within such orders, is
based on seeing women as being closer to their bodies than men.
Such a positioning of women is also coextensive with patriarchal
claims that link women’s “affinity” to the body with women’s
“weakness” – women are seen as more susceptible to the vicissitudes
of the body – to biological cycles, to psycho-somaticization, to
difficulties separating and/or maintaining “clear boundaries.” The
implications of such alliances are that for man to be man, he needs to
disavow the body and its affiliations. The Cartesian split perpetuates a
perception of the body as a product of a raw, brute, passive nature
that needs to be civilized and polished by culture. The body is seen as
an impediment or an obstacle, instead of as a cultural interweaving
and reciprocal production of the “subjective” and the “natural.”
Grosz (1994) observes that the implications of such patriarchal
(and misogynist) views gained strength from the belief that “women’s
bodies are presumed to be incapable of men’s achievements, being
weaker, more prone to (hormonal) irregularities, intrusions, and
unpredictabilities” (1994, p. 14). This misogynist thinking sanctioned
patriarchal myths and practices that attributed the purely conceptual
order to be the prerogative of men. Women were therefore deemed
unfit to enter the conceptual order and, by extension, the social and
political orders, due to their proximity to the body. Their role (as
objects) was to satiate the corporeal needs of men. Men’s corporeal
needs are often disavowed and projected on to women.
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Thus with the advent of the Cartesian split, based on the
disavowal of nature/body/woman, a symbolic division was
introduced. This division allocated the cultural, intelligible and the
“transcendental” to the masculine and the material, corporeal,
sensible, and “natural” to the feminine. With this symbolic division,
women are severed from their own becoming as they are prevented
access to culture. This loss of subjectivity, resulting from the link with
the object and the body, has produced consequences for women
within the biological, interpersonal, religious and social realms. For
instance, the oppression of women was based on the biological
justification that their capacity of either bearing or raising children
makes them less able to engage in the social roles that are virtually
granted to men at birth. In the essay, “When Descartes met the fitness
babe: Academic Cartesianism and the late Twentieth-Century Cult of
the Body,” Leslie Heywood (1999) observes that the preoccupation of
women with their bodies within the contemporary culture (evidenced,
for example, in the proliferation of low-fat diets, weight loss programs,
gym memberships, liposuctions, etc.) is one manifestation of the
legacy of Cartesianism. Heywood argues:
If, as an inheritor of the canonical Western
tradition, she (woman) internalizes a worldview that
is male … [she] almost cannot do otherwise than
develop a preoccupation with her body, since that
body has made her the negative other of culture.
(1999, p. 273)
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Positioned as the “negative other” of culture, she will continue to
subjugate her body through strict control and mastery in order to live
up to her internalized (male) worldview.
In the next section, I take up how the existential
phenomenological tradition confronted the problematic of the
Cartesian tradition, particularly the inheritance of the Cartesian
subject and its implications for the mind-body division. I also discuss
the similarities and differences between existential phenomenology
and the psychoanalytically-informed philosophy of Irigaray in terms of
their understanding of embodiment vis-à-vis the motif of sexual
difference.

1.4 Existential phenomenology and sexual difference
Existential phenomenology developed out of the critique of
Cartesian metaphysics posed by, thinkers such as Edmund Husserl,
Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. While
their emphases and styles of thought diverged in important ways,
their philosophies all challenged the pervasive and prevalent model of
the Cartesian subject, particularly in its disembodied, decontextualized and universal aspects. To begin with, existential
phenomenology underscores the significance of the fact that the
subject who doubts is always already embodied. Luijpen and Koren
(1969) explicate this concept, of a corporeal interrelatedness of “mind,”
“body,” and “world,” as follows: “Without the body and the world,
however, the subject is not what he is, a human subject; the subject
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needs what he himself is not – the body and the world – in order to be
a subject” (1969, p. 33). Since mind and body always already exist as
a meaningful and interrelated event, the Cartesian attempt to
(re)connect them is redundant. One implication of this discovery is
that the foundational mode of relationship is not one of knowledge but
of existence; however, existence is given to us in and through lived
experience. Existential phenomenologists focus on the articulation of
embodied lived experiences and attempt to establish the conditions of
possibility for the experiences to emerge as a series of meaningful and
interrelated events.
What is common to Existential Phenomenology and Irigaray’s
psychoanalytically-informed philosophy is that both are curious about
the subject’s place within the imaginary. While I will elaborate on this
term later (as understood within the psychoanalytic discourse), for
now, the term imaginary can be understood as follows: while always
already structured by language and discursive practices, the
imaginary is rooted in the subject’s relationship to an image of his/her
body. Both Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray are interested in the prediscursive experience of the subject (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 130;
Irigaray, 1993a, p. 151), as the articulation of lived experience is
always already infused by specific meanings existent in culture. The
term prediscursive experience refers to the moment before logic-bound
language frames the meaning of the experience (Merleau-Ponty, 1973,
p. 10-14). Both are interested as well in understanding how and why
certain subject-relevant cultural meanings become dominant, while
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others remain latent. While existential phenomenology, however,
acknowledges the social, political, historical and cultural engendering
of the subject, it typically neglects to address the particular
significance of embodied sexual difference and its constituting role. In
other words, existential phenomenology fails to recognize that the
factors constituting our lived experience are themselves derivative of a
collective and shared discourse that is framed by a phallocentric
economy of relations. To illustrate this, I will explore a statement from
the praxis of Ernesto Spinelli, a leading existential phenomenological
therapist, whose praxis I will examine in depth in my subsequent
chapters. In the context of attending to one of his patient’s anxiety
about growing old, Spinelli states, “How each of us deals with our
death anxiety is likely to be as varied and unique as our experience of
being alive” (1997, p. 10). While this assumption is valid from an
existential phenomenological perspective, it overlooks the fact that the
“experience of being alive” is different for men and women, beyond
simple “individual difference,” but is marked by our “sexuation.” By
the use of the term “sexuation,” I refer in part to the constitution of
the body, which should “not evoke a precultural, presocial, or
prelinguistic pure body but a body as social and discursive object, a
body bound up in the order of desire, signification, and power” (Grosz,
1994, pp. 18-19). I would also add that this term characterizes our
taking up a position as a subject vis-à-vis the symbolic order (that
which governs our inter-subjective relations). If our sexuation is
“inherited” (e.g. the manner in which I gesticulate with my hands,
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brought to my attention by a family member, is an unintended,
embodied identification with my father) then it is crucial to develop a
critical understanding of how and/or what is handed down to us.
Existential phenomenologists describe inter-subjectivity as if it
is constituted through our embodied subject’s interaction with
another embodied subject of the same kind, overlooking the sexually
specific differences of the two subjects – both sensory and
morphological. This means that existential phenomenologists describe
and analyze the experience of an embodied subject not as an
experience of a concrete other, but as an abstraction based on the
morphology of the male sex. In this regard, Irigaray’s
conceptualization of the imaginary goes further than that of the
existential phenomenologists. Margaret Whitford (1991) observes that
Irigaray conceptualizes the imaginary in terms of sex, either male or
female. More specifically, she points out that for Irigaray:
[T]he imaginary either bears the morphological
marks of the male body, whose cultural products
are characterized by unity, teleology, linearity, selfidentity, and so on or it bears the morphological
marks of the female body, characterized by
plurality, non-linearity, fluid identity and so on.
(1991, p. 54)
Thus by overlooking the sexual markings on the imaginary and lived
experience, existential phenomenology colludes with phallocentrism.
For Irigaray, though, sexual difference is fundamental in exploring the
cultural imaginary.
In the next chapter, I will elaborate on Irigaray’s understanding
of the relationship between the imaginary and lived experience, and
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how each bears the morphological marks of the male or the female
body. I will also examine what such markings mean in relation to
subjectivity and sexual difference.

1.5 Luce Irigaray and the question of sexual difference
For Irigaray, the question of sexual difference is a major
philosophical issue. In her words, “Sexual difference is probably the
issue in our time which could be our ‘salvation’ if we thought it
through” (1993a, p. 5). According to her, ignoring the question of
sexual difference amounts to privileging the masculine. Irigaray’s
interest in, and critique of, the problematic of sexual difference
demonstrates that the Western cultural imaginary is haunted by the
specter of phallocentrism, a specter which threatens to suffocate the
space for any inter-subjective communication. To her, it is more
important to question the materials out of which the cultural
imaginary is constructed than it is to question the cultural
construction of subjectivity itself. In other words, for her, only when
the cultural imaginary is re-conceptualized vis-à-vis sexual difference,
can it positively affect the lives of men and women. In this sense,
Irigaray’s style and critique of Western thought situates her within the
tradition of post-structuralism (Berg, 1991; Weedon, 1997).
Poststructuralist thought holds the view that any study is itself
culturally conditioned and therefore not free from preconceptions and
prejudices. For instance, to understand the meaning of a text, it is
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necessary to not only study the text itself, but also critically examine
the contexts and the systems that came together to produce the
specific meaning that shows itself. To this end, in the next section I
examine the role post-structuralism plays with regard to the study of
underlying structures in relation to sexual difference and Irigaray’s
own unique contribution in this tradition.

1.6 Irigaray and poststructuralist critique
Poststructuralist thinkers like Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida,
and Luce Irigaray have critiqued Western metaphysics, finding in
particular, its “blind spot” in seeing/thinking the problems of sexual
difference. Lacan critiques the Western metaphysical subject as being
indifferent to its sexual difference, Derrida (1973) critiques the
concept of presence in Husserl’s phenomenology rendered through his
critique of the “masculine” properties of the voice, and Irigaray (1985a)
critiques the gap in the “symmetry” posited between the sexes in
Sigmund Freud’s account of femininity. In my analysis, however, Luce
Irigaray’s critique of Western metaphysical texts does more than
articulate the sexual de-centering of the subject, the privileging of
masculine presence over feminine absence, and of the masculine
gender over the feminine. She presents positive articulations of female
embodiment that avoid essentializing sexual difference and gender. In
addition, she offers a systematic and detailed rethinking of the
conditions that would make it possible for women to have “a home in
the symbolic order” (Whitford, 1991, p. 156). Finally, she presents
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psychosocial and politico-economic structures within which sexually
different subjects can engage in communication without neutralizing
each other.
In her writings, Irigaray observes that although there are two
sexes, only the masculine has a place in Western metaphysical
thinking. She points out that within the Western metaphysical
economy, the feminine is rendered incapable of representation on its
own terms and remains foreclosed. As she states, “The ‘feminine’ is
always described in terms of deficiency or atrophy, as the other side of
the sex that alone holds a monopoly on value: the male sex” (Irigaray,
1985b, p. 69). When the feminine is invoked, it is usually subjected to
a phallocentric economy and thus gets reduced to a poor copy or
imitation of the masculine. To illustrate her fundamental critique of
Western metaphysics, I will turn to her critique of Sigmund Freud,
articulated in her groundbreaking work, Speculum of the Other Woman
(1985a). In the first section of this book, Irigaray examines “the blind
spot of an old dream of symmetry.” She analyses what constitutes
“normal womanhood” in Freud’s theory of sexuality. Her analysis
reveals that Freud’s construction materials are based on his
assumption that “anatomy is destiny.” That is, for Freud, woman’s
lack of a penis evokes in her the desire to want to have something that
the man has. This desire/lack will “form the basis for ‘normal
womanhood’” (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 49). In the final analysis, according
to Irigaray, “sexual pleasure boils down to being plus or minus one
sex organ: the penis. And sexual ‘otherness’ comes down to ‘not
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having it’” (1985a, p. 52). According to Irigaray, this mistake of
Freud’s phallic-centered economy of overlooking the sexual specificity
of what it means to be woman is the “blind spot of an old dream of
symmetry.” The old dream of symmetry stems from the patriarchal
fantasy that women (as poor imitations of men) can become women
only by striving to become the masculine phantasy of the feminine.
For instance, in the beginning of the twentieth century, many women
attempted to free themselves and reclaim their full humanity through
adopting the masculine ideal of success.

1.7 Rationale for critiquing Ernesto Spinelli
Ernesto Spinelli is one of the most influential existentialphenomenological scholar/practitioners in contemporary therapy.
Through his seminars, lectures and writings, Spinelli has earned an
international recognition as an innovator in both theory and practice.
He has been in private practice in London for more than two decades,
and is also a clinical supervisor. He works as a Senior Fellow at the
School of Psychotherapy and Counselling, Regents College, and has
published several books and articles addressing aspects of existential
psychotherapy, including his most recent book, Practising Existential
Psychotherapy: The Relational World (2007). Through his praxis,
publications, and coaching programs, Spinelli contributes in a
significant manner towards the ongoing development of existential
phenemenological psychotherapy.
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In choosing Spinelli’s work as an exemplar of existential
phenomenology, I am motivated by several factors. First, he goes
beyond an articulation of the fundamental theoretical concepts that
constitute existential phenomenology, also attempting to clarify “what
it might be like to engage in (an existential phenomenological)
therapeutic relationship” (1997, p. 4). Hence, he provides case
material and first person narratives that illuminate how existential
phenomenology informs his own personal practice. My in-depth
reading of his work shows that his knowledge and expertise as an
existential phenomenologist is thorough and systematic. Furthermore,
his “practitioner narratives” provide an important resource in
understanding the workings of his imaginary in relation to the real of
sexual difference as it emerges in the therapeutic relationship. Also,
my choice of Spinelli is influenced by his openness to current
developments in the intellectual world. He acknowledges that
existential phenomenological therapy’s recent developments “have
been greatly influenced by hermeneutics, narrative theory, and poststructuralism” (1997, p. 5). In this context, he observes that the
developments in existential phenomenological therapy via such
influences “should make it plain that its ideas provide a significantly
different means of examining and dealing with the wide range of
problems that provoke people to seek the services of a therapist to
those which infuse most other contemporary therapeutic models”
(1997, p. 5). Spinelli’s acknowledgment regarding existential
phenomenological psychotherapy’s current influences frees it from
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being elitist and insular. His openness towards other influences
prompts me to state that existential phenomenological therapy can
also benefit from a critique from the perspective of sexual difference
and feminist thought as conceptualized by Luce Irigaray.
Irigaray is also an active practitioner of psychotherapy, and she
too writes about her experience as a psychoanalyst as a means of
building psychoanalytic theory. In addition, both Spinelli and Irigaray
work as phenomenologists – exposing latent (or forgotten) conditions
of possibilities for what shows or appears. However, while Spinelli’s
articulation of existential phenomenology is clinically useful for
understanding the processes involved in a given psychotherapeutic
encounter, his work is devoid of any direct reference to sexual
difference. Specifically, Spinelli does not explore the lived reality of
what it might be for a woman to become other than what she is
normatively assumed to be. Based on this omission on his part, we
could infer that he has inadvertently colluded with the dominant
cultural assumptions about what it means to be woman. If that is the
case, perhaps his own critique of today’s psychotherapy as becoming
“an ally of dominant cultural assumptions rather than one of culture’s
most trenchant critics” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 18) could be aptly applied to
his own understanding and application of existential
phenomenological psychotherapy.
Spinelli does attempt to articulate what it means to be a human
subject in the context of a sexual relationship. Invoking MerleauPonty’s arguments regarding embodied consciousness, Spinelli
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elaborates by saying, “Sexual encounters provide us with a pivotal
means with which to express our presence to ‘the other’ and, in turn,
to express the presence of ‘the other’ to ourselves” (2001, p. 82). While
he recognizes sexual encounters as “pivotal” in the understanding of
the subject’s relationship to the other, he remarks that Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s interest in sexuality is not about “issues of male or
female sexuality, sexual orientation or the sociopolitical dimensions of
sexuality” (2001, pp. 82-83). Spinelli’s remark that the meaning of
sexuality belongs to the “inter-relational dimensions” suggests that
the inter-relational and the sociopolitical are ultimately unrelated.
Correlatively, Spinelli’s failure to address the specificity of female
sexuality anywhere in his texts implies he assumes a normative
conceptualization of female sexuality. Such an assumption on
Spinelli’s part might lead to a clinical exploration of women’s
sufferings only in the context of their personal histories and not in
relation to cultural ideologies. If existential phenomenology is about
the exploration of inter-subjective possibilities of a given way of being,
then drawing from a cultural imaginary grounded on patriarchal
fantasies produces only a monologue, one which can only satisfy the
exigencies of the male subject.
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1.8 Irigaray’s sexual difference and Spinelli’s existential
phenomenological psychology
Hence we arrive at a place from which to understand both the
cogency and the urgency of Irigaray’s critique of the dominant modes
of eliding sexual difference in contemporary Western culture generally,
but in therapeutic praxis more specifically, regarding the claims of
Spinelli’s existential phenomenology to reveal the texture of lived
experience as inter-relational. Some of the questions worth exploring
from the perspective of Irigaray’s post-structuralism are: At what
points in Spinelli’s work do we find the elision of sexual difference?
More specifically, does his work recognize the phallocentric
structuring of “woman” within the inter-relational realm? Finally, if
the meaning of what it means to be woman does not get represented
on its own terms, what consequences does this have for his praxis?
My analysis of his work through Irigaray’s notion of sexual
difference will make explicit some of Spinelli’s implicit assumptions
regarding the issues that encompass the inter-subjective realm of
existential psychotherapy. A re-examined understanding will call upon
his existential phenomenological psychology to be true to its own
project of not forgetting to pay attention to fundamental questions; of
not forgetting the inter-subjective nature of the lebenswelt, and of not
forgetting to question its own cultural assumptions regarding intersubjectivity vis-à-vis sexual difference.
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1.9 Possible benefits of incorporating sexual difference in
Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy
Critiquing Spinelli’s existential phenomenological therapy from
the perspective of sexual difference will benefit practitioners of
existential phenomenological psychotherapy. For instance, paying
careful attention to the motif of sexual difference in the lived
experiences of human subjects and situating the same within the
inter-relational realm will help revitalize and open the space for a
genuine dialogue between two subjects instead of a monologue. An
example from my professional practice will help illustrate this point. A
couple of years ago, I worked with a female patient in her mid-fifties
whose presenting concerns involved a desire to reestablish her “voice”
in the context of her relationships with her husband and her mother.
During the course of therapy, I recognized that having/not having a
voice – her concern to “be heard” was inextricably linked to her
identity as a woman. Identity is, in turn linked to the cultural
imaginary. To her, I was a representative of an “other” who was
supposedly different and understanding compared to the others in her
life at that time. Looking back, I can state that my
intervention/interpretation of what was happening in the moment
made a shift in the inter-relational realm. That moment can be
marked as crucial in our interaction, as my client was able to enter
into a dialogue and also make her voice heard in her terms.
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Recognizing and acknowledging sexual difference would mean
that the existential phenomenological practitioner needs to utilize
skills that would help him/her navigate challenges that a female
patient struggles with as she tries to redefine herself. In a general
sense, the practitioner would benefit if he/she positions him-herself
as a participant and not as an outside observer, use interventions that
are about the here and now (between the therapist and the client), is
willing to take risks on behalf of sexual difference, and invent spaces
that would allow women to assume and own their sexed ‘I’ position.
By being alert to the struggles emerging from the awareness of sexual
difference, existential psychotherapy will continue to deal with “the
world” in all its dimensions without evicting it out of the consulting
room. Above all, an engagement with “sexual difference” will force
Spinelli’s existential phenomenological psychology to challenge its own
assumptions regarding the normative assumptions of female
sexuality.
In this dissertation, I will articulate the place of sexual
difference in Spinelli's existential phenomenological psychology. In so
doing, I will apply the deconstructive psychoanalytic techniques
utilized by Irigaray in her analyses of the "blind spots" of various
psychoanalytic and philosophical positions toward understanding how
Spinelli's approach to the inter-subjective landscape of psychotherapy
is influenced by certain implicit and explicit assumptions concerning
sexual difference. Specifically, I will examine how he takes up the
body as it manifests in therapy, and how this either allows for or
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disavows the presence of the both the client and therapist as sexuallyspecific “others.” This will require a close attention to the constructs
he deploys in his theoretical accounts of, and justifications for,
elements of his practice that address embodiment and sexual
difference. Through this analysis, I hope to show that by paying
attention to sexual difference, existential psychotherapy can benefit
from being attuned to creative possibilities that emerge as the
therapist listens to the body speaking (both one's own and the
client's) with a different ear. I also want to show that when the
therapist can move beyond the constrictions of a phallocentric
discourse, sexual difference as a non-phallic relation to language and
body will structure inter-subjectivity.
In the next chapter, I will first explicate the notion of the
imaginary within the psychoanalytic tradition to contextualize
Irigaray’s own understanding of the imaginary. My outline will provide
us an understanding of Irigaray’s own notion of the imaginary and
how it impacts her work in creating the conditions of possibility for
women to take up the position of an “I” within the socio-cultural
order.
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Chapter 2
The imaginary and sexual difference
The coherence of a conceptual system does not
imply its truth, but may be the coherence of its
phantasy.
- Margaret Whitford,
Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, p. 69
The theory of the human body is always a part
of a world-picture….The theory of the human
body is always a part of a fantasy.
- James Hillman, The Myth of Analysis, p. 220

2.1 The imaginary within the psychoanalytic tradition
Irigaray’s (1985a; 1985b) critique of the Western cultural
imaginary is primarily based on her deconstruction of the notion of
the imaginary as developed within the psychoanalytic tradition of
Jacques Lacan (1977). Within these traditions, the imaginary is
primarily (though not exclusively) associated with the formation of the
ego. Freud’s understanding of the ego’s formation evolved from his
attempts to reconcile a biological and a psychological approach to
understanding psychic life. Grosz (1994, pp. 27-39) identifies two
understandings of the ego that Freud proposes in his study of
perception, one from The Ego and the Id (1923/1961) and the other
from On Narcissism (1914/1957). Briefly stated, the “realist model” of
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ego formation consists of seeing the ego as a pre-determined entity, a
mediating principle between pleasure and the demands of reality.
Freud (1923/1961) compares the ego to that of a man on horse back:
In its relation to the id, the ego is like a man on
horse back, who has to hold in check the superior
strength of the horse; with this difference, that the
rider tries to do so with his own strength while the
ego uses borrowed forces. (p. 25)
The main function, then, of the “realist ego” is to mediate, to keep in
check the forces of pleasure versus the demands of a repressive
reality. Alternatively, the “narcissistic model” sees the ego as selfimage constructed through a dynamic process of internalization of
images, both of one’s own body and that of others’. In this view, the
ego is inter-subjective, in as much as it relies on the subject’s
relations with others.
Jacques Lacan founds his understanding of the imaginary on
Freud’s narcissistic model of the ego. According to Grosz, Lacan
understands the ego to be “an imaginary outline or projection of the
body, the body insofar as it is imagined and represented for the
subject by the image of others (including its own reflection in the
mirror)” (Grosz, 1994, p. 39). Lacan identifies the mirror stage as the
moment when ego formation takes place, although he clarifies that
this moment is not the decisive and final one. In a paper delivered at
the International Congress of Psychoanalysis in 1949, Lacan
elaborates on the role of the mirror stage in the formation of the
subject. He describes the phenomenon of the reflected image in the
mirror and the significance of the same in the formation of its ego:
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This jubilant assumption of his specular image by
the child at the infans stage, still sunk in his motor
incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to
exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic
matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial
form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of
identification with the other, and before language
restores to it, in the universal, its function as
subject. (Lacan, 1977, p. 2)
According to Lacan, the child experiences jubilation, a feeling of
elation at the moment it recognizes its image in the mirror. This
pleasure stems from the fact that it discovers an “I”, a sense of
coherence of itself that is separate from others. In other words, the
child sees itself as a unity, a whole, in contrast to its experience of its
body as fragmentary and uncoordinated.
At the same time, the child also experiences a feeling of
ambivalence towards the image it sees in the mirror. The child
experiences frustration because the image it sees is beyond it, an ideal
to be attained. It is an ideal because it is always also the other, out of
reach, unknown; yet to be attained. In other words, the reflected
image in the mirror produces a sense of an “I” and “not-I” at the same
time. In dealing with the ambivalence, the child will begin to
internalize the mirror image instead of rejecting it. Internalization
takes place because the image promises mastery, control over the
body, and it holds the lure of the desire of the other; however, this
internalization comes with a price – dissonance. The image identified
with is different from its actual lived experience. Grosz (1990) explains
how this dissonance organizes the infant’s psyche:
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The image is always the image of another. Yet the
otherness of the other is not entirely alien. The
subject, to be a subject at all, internalizes otherness
as its condition of possibility. It is thus radically
split, unconscious of the processes of its own
production, divided by lack and rupture. The ego
illusorily sees itself as autonomous and selfdetermined, independent of otherness. (p. 43)
In other words, as Lacan observes, the dissonance produced in this
dynamic between the child and his image will coagulate into a desire
for being or having what the other desires. In his own words, “This
form will crystallize in the subject’s internal conflictual tension, which
determines the awakening of his desire for the object of the other’s
desire” (1977, p. 19). Hence, the pursuit of the object of the other’s
desire will continue to structure and constitute the subject’s identity,
and bring with it fantasies of aggression and control.
The jubilant recognition of seeing the unified body in the mirror
indicates that ego formation cannot be thought of without the body.
Thus, Grosz (1990) observes that for Lacan, the ego is not only “a
product of the internalization of otherness,” but also “a psychical
projection of the body, a kind of map of the body’s psycho-social
meaning” (p. 43). Here, the word “body” refers to the lived
understanding of one’s anatomy (which can operate at an
unconscious, preconscious, or a conscious level), and is itself
psychically mapped or structured along the lines of one’s parental or
familial significations and cultural fantasies of the body’s
organization. Thus the ego can be understood as an internalized map

29
constructed with the materials derived from one’s relations to others
and to culture as well as the lived understanding of one’s body.
In summary, the psychoanalytic tradition posits that the ego is
formed on the basis of the child’s recognition of its own specular
image reflected in the mirror and by others. Consequently, the mirror
stage initiates a dyadic structure of imaginary identifications that is
dependent on images and representations. For example, when the
child sees itself in a mirror, the parent might say, “You look just like
your father,” or “You have grandpa’s eyes,” statements that provide
images for the child to identify with. The ego can be seen as the
sedimentation of images of others. This means that a subject’s claim
to knowledge is infiltrated by a function of the ego’s investment in
sustaining (through identification) certain images that please it and
rejecting those that are unacceptable. For instance, we see evidence of
this in the use of the terms that evoke images like swallowing and/or
incorporating that something is thought to be true or acceptable and
spitting and/or expelling as something that is thought to be false or
deemed unacceptable. For example, in the case of a person who either
feels like throwing up or literally throws up when he/she perceives
something traumatic (like a terrible car accident), we can say that this
person is experiencing a kind of inability to incorporate something
traumatic and so is expelling that which is unacceptable.
Grosz (1990) characterizes the ego as a dynamic relation
between the subject and others. She maintains, “The ego can thus be
seen as an intrasubjective relation founded on inter-subjectivity. It is
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the coagulation and residue of internalized images of others” (1990, p.
46). The imaginary is the domain whereby relations between self and
others as unconscious fantasy exist in an unmediated fashion. What
is initiated in the imaginary becomes solidified as the child enters the
symbolic order. Entry into language is evidenced in the ability to say
“I”, to take up a proper name, which in turn, binds together the
imaginary identifications and helps towards forming a cohesive social
identity. Within the Lacanian tradition, the coveted object in the
symbolic order is the Phallus, the master signifier. To have a social
existence, one must have a relationship to the Phallus. In the next
section I will discuss Irigaray’s critique of the assumptions that
construct the psychoanalytic imaginary. My interpretations in the
following section are influenced by Elizabeth Grosz and Margaret
Whitford’s readings of Irigaray.

2.2 Irigaray’s critique of the psychoanalytic imaginary
Luce Irigaray shows much interest in the notion of the
imaginary and its relevance for understanding subjectivity and sexual
difference. My interpretation of Irigaray’s critique of the imaginary
within the psychoanalytic tradition is influenced by the interpretations
of Margaret Whitford and Elizabeth Grosz. In Luce Irigaray: Philosophy
in the Feminine Margaret Whitford (1991) traces the development of
the imaginary in Irigaray’s work. She claims that while Irigaray draws
on various sources in developing her own understanding of the
imaginary, the psychoanalytic tradition in which she was schooled

31
remains the central source. Far from being uncritical of that tradition,
however, Irigaray’s account deconstructs the Freudian and Lacanian
notion of the imaginary vis-à-vis her articulation of the role of sexual
difference in the ego’s domination.
Whitford (1991) observes that although Irigaray does not
discuss Lacan’s re-conceptualization of the Freudian understanding of
the ego as self-image directly, she does acknowledge Lacan’s blind
spot in his discussion of ego formation and the imaginary. To begin
with, Irigaray questions the assumptions about the physical
properties of the mirror that are implicit in Freud’s and Lacan’s
account. More specifically, Whitford echoes Irigaray when she states
that the flat mirror that reflects the specular image “does not reflect
the sexual organs and the sexual specificity of the woman” (Whitford,
1991, p. 65). Irigaray suggests instead a different sort of mirror (the
speculum) that allows for “representation” of a woman’s morphology.
When Irigaray refers to a woman’s morphology, she is not referring to
a genetically coded female body or even the female anatomy, but to
the body as a product of “social inscriptions, always inherently social”
(Grosz, 1989, p. 112). Whitford explains Irigaray’s thinking when she
states, “The body which is reflected in this flat mirror, and thus the
imaginary body subtending subjectivity, is either a male body (with
male sexual organs) or else a defective male body (a male body without
sexual organs, hence castrated)” (1991, p. 65). Irigaray also suggests
that women as “components of the mirror” (1985b, p. 151) support the
male edifice in an invisible manner by being situated as the “silvering
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at the back of the mirror” (1985a, p.197) and thus always been taken
for granted.
Within the psychoanalytic tradition, then, a woman is
predestined to be without an imaginary specific to her sex. Hence the
psychoanalytic imaginary is revealed as “masculine,” as specific to the
morphology of the male. To put this differently, the imaginary that
subtends subjectivity is built on the idea that the grid through which
the girl comes to make sense of the whole world is modeled on the
boy’s experience of seeing the world. In this model, her difference and
sexual specificity is overlooked and subsumed under the male grid.
For example, in cultures where men have the tendency to sexually
objectify women, heterosexual women invariably internalize this
masculine perception of physical appearance and work towards
“shaping” their physical appearance to fit the masculine perceptional
grid of what is desirous and acceptable.
The implication of a mono-sexual model for the little girl is, in
Irigaray’s words, “[T]he little man that the little girl is, must become a
man minus certain attributes whose paradigm is morphological –
attributes capable of determining, of assuring, the reproductionspecularization of the same” (1985a, p. 27). Thus women in this
mono-sexual discourse are perceived as defective males and their role
is to safeguard sameness. For example, as Irigaray observes that in
case of marriage, a woman is “forced to renounce the marks of her
ancestry and inscribe herself on man’s pedigree. She leaves her
family, her ‘house,’ her name – though admittedly it too is only a
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patronymic – her family tree, in favor of her husband’s” (1985a, p. 33).
She is an object that is exchanged between men (father to husband) in
order to safeguard sameness.
Whitford (1991, p.65) characterizes Irigaray’s critique of both
Freud and Lacan as “psychoanalyzing the psychoanalysts.” Irigaray
does this when she analyzes the analyst’s imaginary, the unconscious
fantasies that subtend the logic of psychoanalytic rationality. Yet,
Freud and Lacan are not the only ones whose imaginary is male;
rather, their conceptualizations reflect their participation in the
phallocentric cultural symbolic while also reinforcing it.
By critiquing the imaginary, Whitford cautions that Irigaray is
not trying to prescribe what the female should be. Instead, she
challenges the presumption that the Western imaginary is a given,
and therefore something that is immutable and true. Instead,
Whitford shows that for Irigaray “what is taken to be the unalterable
order of reality (discursive or otherwise) is in fact imaginary and
therefore susceptible to change” (1991, p. 67). For instance, Irigaray
wonders what it would be like if a woman’s desires were not governed
by the male imaginary:
If woman had desires other than ‘penis-envy,’ this
would call into question the unity, the uniqueness,
the simplicity of the mirror charged with sending
man’s image back to him – albeit inverted. Call into
question its flatness. The specularization, and
speculation, of the purpose of (his) desire could no
longer be two-dimensional. (1985a, p. 51)
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Irigaray (1985b) also cautions that we cannot leap out of the
economy of the male imaginary or the cultural symbolic to elucidate a
“new theory of women.” Instead she proposes a different strategy:
[T]he issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of
which woman would be the subject or the object,
but of jamming the theoretical machinery itself, of
suspending its pretension to the production of a
truth and of a meaning that are excessively
univocal. Which presupposes that women do not
aspire simply to be men’s equals in knowledge. That
they do not claim to be rivaling men in constructing
a logic of the feminine that would still take ontotheo-logic as its model …. They should not put it,
then, in the form ‘What is woman?’ but rather,
repeating/interpreting the way in which, within
discourse, the feminine finds itself defined as lack,
deficiency, or as imitation and negative image of the
subject, they should signify that with respect to this
logic a disruptive excess is possible on the feminine
side. (1985b, p. 78)
So, she cautions against answering questions concerning
“womanhood” as a static and essential category or an unchanging
material referent, as she understands such questions to emerge from
the very discourse that ignores the difference of “her” sex. Any
transformation of theory, practice, on the material reality of men’s and
women’s lives requires a fundamental shift at the level of the
imaginary.
Irigaray suggests that “re-imagining” the imaginary will require
a new strategy for listening to the unconscious in/of philosophy:
We need to listen (psycho)analytically to its
procedures of repression, to the structuration of
language that shores up its representations,
separating the true from the false, the meaningful
from the meaningless, and so forth…. What is called
for instead is an examination of the operation of the
‘grammar’ of each figure of discourse, its syntactic
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laws or requirements, its imaginary configurations,
its metaphoric networks, and also of course, what it
does not articulate at the level of utterance: its
silences. (1985b, p. 75)
Thus for Irigaray, it is not about prescribing what the female should
be, but describing how it functions within the western imaginary and
symbolic operations, in order to show how what is taken to be the
unalterable order of reality (discursive or otherwise) is in fact
imaginary and therefore susceptible to change.

2.3 Phenomenologists’ and Irigaray’s understanding of the
imaginary
Margaret Whitford (1991) observes that both Irigaray and the
phenomenologists (like Merleau-Ponty and Sartre) share an
understanding of the imaginary as structuring experiences. Irigaray
states in her An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993a), that like MerleauPonty (1968), she is also interested in the “pre-discursive experience.”
For Merleau-Ponty, the pre-discursive experience is that which
informs our rationality and judgments. By returning to this moment,
Merleau-Ponty hoped to create a different language, a language of
alterity. For Merleau-Ponty, however, this pre-discursive experience is
always already historical. In other words, it precedes our very
existence. This claim on the part of Merleau-Ponty raises suspicions in
Irigaray. According to her, he fails to see how a different language can
be created if the pre-discursive is always already implicated in the
symbolic.
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As stated earlier, Irigaray’s notion of the imaginary goes beyond
that of the phenomenologists, when she conceptualizes the imaginary
in terms of the morphological marks of bodies. For instance, the body
gets mapped into zones (erogenous and otherwise) as in the case of an
infant that is fed, thus mapping his/her mouth (instead of the ear or
the nose, for instance) as a zone of pleasure and satiation; or when
the child “learns” that he/she uses hands to touch things (and not the
mouth for instance), thus mapping the hand as a zone for
experiencing tactile sensations, etc. To Irigaray, the phenomenologists
fail to take into account the sexual other, “an other whose body’s
ontological status would differ from my own” (Irigaray, 1993a, p.157).
Irigaray’s critical reading of the psychoanalytic tradition extends
to the Western metaphysical tradition. Her critique reveals that the
imaginary that underlies the Western metaphysical tradition is based
on an exclusionary model – the male gets represented on his own
terms in the cultural imaginary and the female gets subsumed and
functions according to male parameters. However, Irigaray also
recognizes the importance of being phenomenological in her
methodology. To this effect, Irigaray asserts, “A certain recourse, or
return to the phenomenological method seems necessary in order to
make enter into the universe of the rational some natural, corporeal,
sensible realities which until now had been removed from it” (Irigaray,
2000, p. 156). A phenomenological method/description would reveal
that the natural, corporeal and sensible permeate and suffuse all
knowledge. The Cartesian subject, on the contrary, would try to purify
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all knowledge of the products of imagination to arrive at clear and
distinct knowledge. In this context, as Whitford points out, Irigaray
believes the “disjunction from the imaginary cannot finally be made,
that knowledge always bears the mark of the imaginary, and that
what we take to be universal and objective is in fact male” (Whitford,
1991, p. 56). The next section will show how Irigaray’s strategy of
using the elemental provides her a language by which she destabilizes
the conceptual edifice of Western thought by inviting us to pay
attention to what is covered over in our everyday life.
Irigaray (1993c) identifies four basic elements as primitive
categories used by the imagining mind: earth, fire, water and air:
These elements, which, since the beginning of
philosophy, have been a focus of meditation of every
creation of a world, have often been misunderstood
in our culture, which has tended to refuse to think
about the material conditions of existence.…Our socalled human sciences and our day-to-day speech
steer clear of the elements, moving through and
with a language that forgets the matter it names
and by means of which it speaks. (pp. 57-58)
Irigaray posits these four elements in turn as being subtended by a
more basic schema, viz., the male/female division. Her choice of the
four elements provides her a vocabulary (construction materials) to
counter the conceptual edifice of Western metaphysics of being.
Whitford writes:
In the first place, it provides a vocabulary for
talking in the most basic terms about the material
of passional life, about opposition and conflict, or
love and exchange, about fertility and creativity, of
sterility and death, a vocabulary which is more
immediate and direct in its language than the
abstractions of conceptualization, yet without the
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immobilizing tendencies of the concept. It is a
discursive strategy which allows for fluidity. (1991,
p. 61)
Whitford suggests other related reasons for Irigaray to utilize the
elemental vocabulary when speaking about the female body and its
morphology, and when speaking of the erotic. Elemental, materiallyfocused language allows for a displacement of the visual and/or the
gaze, for example, and allows for a speech “in terms of space and
thresholds and fluids, fire and water, air and earth, without
objectifying, hypostatizing, or essentializing” (Whitford, 1991, p. 62).
The elemental, hence can “represent” “an unstructured and fluid
psychic space, less constrained by the dominant imaginary, more
open to other possibilities” (Whitford, 1991, p. 62). The next section
examines the possibility opened up by the elemental vocabulary in
symbolizing feminine subjectivity.

2.4 The condition of possibility for a female imaginary and
symbolic
If the Western metaphysical tradition is subtended by a male
imaginary, then it is crucial to ask: how to bring about a change in the
imaginary? Whitford problematizes this issue when she points out
that a change in the imaginary is nearly impossible if the social
institutions “continue to support the phantasies of the male
imaginary” (1991, p. 91). In an incisive and challenging essay, Women
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on the Market, Irigaray (1985b) utilizes a Marxian analysis of
commodities to analyze the role of women as objects. She explains:
Mother, virgin, prostitute: these are the social roles
imposed on women. The characteristics of (so-called)
feminine sexuality derive from them: the
valorization of reproduction and nursing;
faithfulness; modesty, ignorance of and even lack of
interest in sexual pleasure; a passive acceptance of
men’s ‘activity’; seductiveness, in order to arouse
the consumers’ desire while offering herself as its
material support without getting pleasure herself …
Neither as mother nor as virgin nor as prostitute has
woman any right to her own pleasure. (p. 186)
Her analysis of the social roles imposed upon women characterizes
feminine sexuality as objects/material support for enactment of male
fantasies. Ignoring such a characterization of feminine sexuality is
tantamount to perpetuating the status quo.
Whitford also points out that the imaginary cannot be changed
without the symbolic changing also. She clarifies, “The imaginary is
an effect of the symbolic; it is the symbolic which structures the
imaginary, so that there is a sense in which the imaginary does not
exist until it is symbolized” (1991, p. 91). Also, the symbolic,
understood as structure (or a position of enunciation) would be empty
without the contents of the imaginary. Irigaray proposes that
symbolizing the mother-daughter relationship as an archetype for
women’s relations among each other and establishing this externally
in the social register would create a pause in the male imaginary.
Whitford argues that such attempts at symbolic representation “would
constitute an external reality which might block the more damaging
effects of the male imaginary and ideally have a creative outcome”
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(1991, p. 92). This symbolization is not to replace the paternal with
the maternal but would allow the woman as subject to enter into the
symbolic for the first time.
In the next chapter I examine some of the obstacles that stand
in the way of symbolizing woman as subject. I also show how Irigaray
attempts at a positive articulation of female subjectivity vis-à-vis the
conceptual edifice of Western metaphysics.
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Chapter 3
Sexual difference and woman as subject
There is no simple manageable way to leap to
the outside of phallogocentrism, nor any
possible way to situate oneself there, that would
result from the simple fact of being a woman.
- Luce Irigaray, This sex which is not one, p.162
Can we think women as other without
systematizing otherness, without construing it
in terms of the totalizing discourse that defines
woman as other?
- Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros, p. 176-7

3.1 Introduction
Among the many postmodern thinkers who have influenced
Luce Irigaray’s articulation of a female symbolic and sexual difference,
Jacques Derrida’s work is perhaps one of the most important. In
particular, Irigaray is indebted to his deconstructive style of reading
Western metaphysical thought as structured around hierarchal
binaries. A deconstructive reading calls into question the foundations
of Western metaphysics and its economy of “phallogocentrism,” that
is, the operative principle of culture as grounded in values associated
with Western traditional masculinity (a masculinity associated with
among other things, class privilege, “whiteness”, and Judeo-Christian
religious values). For instance, in his work, Speech and Phenomena
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(1973), Derrida critiques the concept of presence in Edmund Husserl’s
privileging of the “masculine” properties of speech over writing (the
unprivileged term). Writing is unprivileged because in relation to
speech, as Derrida notes, the speaker is absent in writing and thus by
implication removed from the immediacy of and control over meaning.
Thus we could say writing as absence/lack can be associated with
“feminine” properties. Derrida remarks that when speech/voice is
suspended, its status also changes to being unstable and ambiguous.
In his own words, “A voice without différance, a voice without writing,
is at once absolutely alive and absolutely dead” (Derrida, 1973, p. 102,
emphasis in original). By destabilizing this bias towards speech as
meaning/presence in Western metaphysics, Derrida deconstructs the
notion of identity as the locus from which meaning as presence
emerges. Derrida renders self-presence as “de-centered”, unstable, in
flux. Derrida and Irigaray however, have different intentions in
questioning and deconstructing the pervasive hierarchical
assumptions of Western metaphysics. While Derrida aims towards
deconstructing phallogocentrism and problematizing any clear-cut
dividing line between two positions, Irigaray is concerned with the
complexity of how to represent the feminine subject in a context where
representation itself is fraught with problems. In this sense, any
insistence on the part of feminists for representation can learn much
from deconstruction (Grosz, 1995, p. 116).
In this chapter then, I will show how unlike Derrida, Luce
Irigaray offers a positive articulation of feminine subjectivity that
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avoids essentializing sexual difference and gender. Derrida claims that
his primary concern is with the deconstruction of conceptual
frameworks and not with the construction of new concepts. In this
context, Derrida’s neologisms like différance, supplement, pharmakon,
and so on, are not concepts per se, but provisional terms coined by
him to offset and put into play rigid, hierarchical binary structures. In
the process of rendering her articulation of feminine subjectivity, I will
also show how Irigaray presents a systematic and detailed rethinking
of the conditions that would make it possible for women to coexist and
dialogue with men on their own terms. Lastly, I will also illustrate the
conditions (as articulated by Irigaray) with which sexually different
subjects can engage in communication without subsuming or
incorporating each other. As two subjects they remain irreducible to
each other and return to themselves without losing their
subjectivities.

3.2 Sexual difference and deconstruction
In this section, I explore how Irigaray utilizes deconstruction in
relation to the task of dealing with the problematic of sexual
difference. Irigaray’s method consists of psychoanalyzing Western
metaphysical discourse and practices in order to bring to the fore the
unconscious, what is repressed. To this end, she adopts Derrida’s
style, namely, deconstruction. More specifically, she adopts
deconstruction’s tactic of de-centering/subverting the central or
privileged term within a binary structure by undercutting its illusory
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independence from the marginalized term. Like Derrida, she does not
attempt to efface Western metaphysical discourse, or to wipe it off the
map, so to speak. As Barbara Johnson, a translator of Derrida’s La
Dissémination, explains, “Deconstruction is not synonymous with
destruction, however. It is in fact much closer to the original meaning
of the word analysis, which etymologically means “to undo” – a virtual
synonym for ‘to deconstruct’” (1980, p. 5). For instance, with the
binary pair man-woman, deconstruction subverts and de-centers the
privileged term, “man” by showing that the term “man” is dependent
on the term “woman” for meaning; adopting the language of biology
(and science fiction), we could describe these terms as “symbionts.”
The marginalized term “woman” would now take on the central
position for a temporary period and thus disrupt the ossified dynamic
of the binary. The intention is to set up a free play that would loosen
the tendency within the binary structure to fix, centralize and totalize.
In this sense, deconstruction is not an attack from the outside, but
like a parasite works from the inside. In Derrida’s words:
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy
structures from the outside. They are not possible
and effective, nor can they take accurate aim,
except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting
them in a certain way, because one always inhabits,
and all the more when one does not suspect it.
Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all
the strategic and economic resources of subversion
from the old structure, borrowing them structurally,
that is to say without being able to isolate their
elements and atoms, the enterprise of
deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to
its own work. (1998, p. 24)
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With the use of the phrase, “in a certain way” Derrida reminds us of
the impossibility of stepping out of the metaphysical economy. Irigaray
however, can be understood as inhabiting the structure in a certain
(“other”) way because she speaks as a woman. Speaking as a woman
means to speak “from a non-existent place, which has to be created or
invented as she goes along, and at the same time to show that
philosophers have a locatable, sexual place of enunciation” (Whitford,
1991, p. 124).
Irigaray adopts a deconstructive style specifically when dealing
with the problematic of sexual difference. She believes that to effect a
change in the symbolic order we cannot simply swap terms around or
make a simple reversal of claims regarding woman. Instead, Irigaray
purposefully adopts the strategy of mimesis in order to deconstruct
the phallocentric representations of women; however, she claims that
mimicry is only a preliminary phase at thinking through sexual
difference. Her mimetic strategy parallels Derrida’s deconstructive
strategy of “inhabiting (the structures) in a certain (other) way.”
Regarding her strategy of mimesis, she writes:
There is, in an initial phase, perhaps only one
‘path,’ the one historically assigned to the feminine:
that of mimicry. One must assume the feminine role
deliberately. Which means already to convert a
form of subordination into an affirmation, and thus
to begin to thwart it …. To play with mimesis is
thus, for a woman, to try to recover the place of her
exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself
to be simply reduced to it ... so as to make ‘visible,’
by an effect of playful repetition what was supposed
to remain invisible: the cover-up of a possible
operation of the feminine in language. (1985b, p.
76)
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Additionally, she claims that her strategy of mimicry is of the sort
“historically assigned to the feminine.” Here, she cites Plato, who
distinguishes two kinds of mimesis: “mimesis as production, which
would lie more in the realm of music, and … mimesis that would be
already caught up in a process of imitation, specularization,
adequation, and reproduction” (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 131). Irigaray
identifies her strategy of mimesis as the latter. Through this strategy
she seeks to deconstruct the feminine requirements of patriarchy.
Margaret Whitford (1991) clarifies the possible reasons for Irigaray’s
use of this strategy. For Irigaray, she observes, any attempt at
representation of women or even their non-representation falls within
the domain of the phallocentric system. Mimesis, as an “initial phase,”
is tactical in as much as through “playful repetition” Irigaray would
make visible what was supposed to be invisible regarding women.
Irigaray’s mimetic strategy is similar to what the noted psychoanalyst
Joan Riviere refers to in her essay, “Womanliness as masquerade,”
written in 1929. She writes, “Womanliness, therefore, [can] be
assumed and worn as a mask, both to hide the possession of
masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if [a woman] was found
to possess it – much as a thief will turn out his pockets and ask to be
searched to prove that he has not stolen the goods” (as cited in
Burgin, Donald, & Kaplan, 1986, p. 37-8). This feminine masquerade
allows a woman who violates social codes of her time by participating
in a “highly” intellectual profession, for example, to project an outward
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expression of extreme femininity in her appearance and behavior in
order to diffuse and allay male fears of the woman “doing a man’s job”
in a man’s world. From the place of cultural support for their role in
mimetic praxis, women as artful mimes can use this strategy toward
protecting themselves from being re-introjected into the masculine
fabric of thought.
Although Derrida recognizes the work of phallogocentric logic in
metaphysical structures, he seems to shy away from pursuing
deconstruction beyond this point. He considers the work of
deconstruction irrelevant after the opposition has been deconstructed.
In fact, after this point, Derrida also appears to be skeptical and wary
of any attempt (of philosophers like Irigaray) at thinking through the
possibility of the radical alterity of the unprivileged term, which is the
“female.” For him, rethinking the other (the repressed term) would
amount to phallocratism (that is, it would reestablish the rule of
repressed term). This would lead to a replay of oppression by the
repressed term. In his words, “[T]he hierarchy of dual oppositions [in
this case male and female] always reestablishes itself” (Derrida, 1981,
p. 42). Derrida is understandably cautious about operating from
outside of metaphysics; in other words, as Chanter observes, “[T]o
deconstruct metaphysics by using any language other than that which
metaphysics itself provides” (1995, p. 247) is unimaginable for
Derrida. Irigaray, too, is well aware of the challenge posed by the trap
of metaphysics. She is aware that it is tricky and slippery to step out
and re-conceptualize the structure after establishing the free play
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between the terms. Thus we can assume her agreement with Derrida
on this point, as expressed in the following caveat:
We do not escape, in particular, by thinking we can
dispense with a rigorous interpretation of
phallogocentrism. There is no simple manageable
way to leap to the outside of phallogocentrism, nor
any possible way to situate oneself there, that would
result from the simple fact of being a woman.
(1985b, p. 162)
In her essay, “Ontology and Equivocation,” Elizabeth Grosz
(1995) is sympathetic to Derrida’s problems with feminist discourse
vis-à-vis deconstruction. However, she also observes a “certain
strategic ambiguity in Derrida’s use of the notion of … a sexuality, a
sexuality before the imposition of dual sex roles, a sexuality that is
somehow ontological but entirely without qualities and attributes”
(1995, p. 121). Grosz clarifies her observations regarding Derrida by
distinguishing between two meanings of the word “sexuality”. She
states:
It is clear that sexuality, in the sense of ‘pleasurable
drive,’ could quite valuably be understood as a
mode of prior indeterminacy that gains its specific
form and qualities a posteriori, and largely as an
effect of binary polarization. It is not so easy to see
how sexuality, in the sense of sexed subjectivity,
male and female, can be understood as
indeterminate. (1995, p. 121-2)
Here Grosz cautions that if we fail to acknowledge sexual difference,
there is a danger of sexual difference collapsing to sexual neutrality.
Thus in her critique of Derrida, Grosz affirms unequivocally that for
her, affirming the “irreducible specificity of each sex relative to the
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other” (1995, 121-2.) is a sine qua non and an a priori to any
discussion of specific forms and qualities of sexuality.
Deconstruction does seem well within its bounds as its concern
is not about valorizing and/or rethinking woman (the unprivileged
term), but to challenge the authority of man (the privileged term) and
to create flexibility within the structure. Unless the conditions of
possibility for articulating her subjectivity is not taken up, she will
remain as the “other of the same” (that is, a poor imitation of man, or
as a negative term, as ‘– A’, where man is represented as ‘A’ (Grosz,
1990, p. 172). As an “other of the same,” woman continues to remain
homeless within the symbolic order. And, I would add, the possibility
of sexual difference – of woman as “other of the other,” as sexually
specific subjects – will continue to have no real place in the psychosocial imagination.

3.3 Sexual division as sexual indifference
One of the major challenges facing a feminist thinker like
Irigaray is to articulate the conditions of existence for woman such
that she may operate as a sexually specific subject in relation to her
environment. To recall, according to her analysis of the psychoanalytic
tradition, the phallus governs the symbolic order. Subjectivity is
structured hence according to the fantasy of either “being” or “having”
a phallus. Since women (as castrated) do not “have” a phallus, they
are alienated in the symbolic order. Language is not able to mediate
the loss that women suffer. This is what allows Irigaray to claim that
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women are homeless within the symbolic order (Grosz, 1990; Whitford
1991).
In her thought-provoking essay, “Divine Women,” Irigaray
(1993c) asserts that positing a divine ideal for women as a model of
subjectivity would serve as a guarantee of a horizon. She asserts that
the divine as horizon is “not a luxury but a necessity” (1993c, p. 67). It
is a necessity because without a guideline, a horizon, women lack a
reference for their own becoming, and can become vulnerable to the
dictates of others. In discussing the leitmotif of “divine,” she reframes
the function of the mirror to suit the needs of woman’s becoming. In
Irigaray’s hands, the mirror stands not as a metaphor for alienation in
and through the gaze of the other, but is used as a metonymic device.
In the phallic economy of subjectivity, the mirror, which serves to
alienate women from their own becoming, is now made by Irigaray to
serve a positive purpose of self-contemplation. Irigaray contends:
We look at ourselves in the mirror to please
someone, rarely to interrogate the state of our body
or our spirit, rarely for ourselves and in search of
our own becoming. The mirror almost always
serves to reduce us to a pure exteriority – of a very
particular kind…. The mirror signifies the
constitution of a fabricated (female) other that I
shall put forward as an instrument of seduction in
my place. I seek to be seductive and to be content
with images of which I theoretically remain the
artisan, the artist. I have yet to unveil, unmask, or
veil myself for me – to veil myself so as to achieve
self-contemplation, for example, to let my gaze
travel over myself so as to limit my exposure to the
other and repossess my own gestures and
garments, thus nestling back into my vision and
contemplation of myself. (1993c, p. 65)
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In other words, the mirror is not a weapon or a tool to alienate a
woman from her own becoming but serves not only as a guide to
gather her fragmented and alienated self but also to validate her in
her autonomous subjectivity. This “self,” however, is not another
“identity,” or a hypostatized entity but a loose assemblage, a series of
provisional, fluid-like contact points.
Irigaray’s analysis (1985a) of the Western metaphysical tradition
also shows that an economy of the death drive constitutes the human
(man and woman). This economy of the death drive is represented in
the concept of castration anxiety, that is, the refusal of the subject to
face loss, historically linked at least (in the history of philosophy) to
notions of mortality and death. Death, in this context, is represented
as a ‘hole’ or ‘nothingness’ within the phallic order. Within the male
imaginary, women stand in close proximity to this lack/hole in
existence. Each gender negotiates this threat of dissolution and
nothingness in his/her own way. Man negotiates his threat by
projecting his anxiety onto woman as she “represents death or the
unthinkable for/by men” (Whitford, 1991, p. 115).
To understand what facilitates this projection of his anxiety onto
woman, I will elaborate on what Irigaray (1993c) describes as the
“flawed distribution” of tasks and functions within the symbolic order.
She observes, “The human race has been divided into two functions,
two tasks, not two genders. Under pain of death, woman has
renounced her gender. Man has done the same, though differently”
(1993c, p. 120). Based on this symbolic distribution, woman bears
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functions and tasks that invalidate her genealogy and transcendence.
For example, the function and task of childrearing that has been
largely borne by women is so well entrenched into the cultural
imaginary-symbolic, thanks to the “flawed distribution” whereby she
was the bearer of the corporeal. In this symbolic division, woman is
the possessor of the unwanted, the unknown, and nothingness.
Whitford echoes Irigaray when she states, “An ethics of sexual
difference, that is, an ethics which recognizes the subjectivity of each
sex, would have to address the symbolic division which allocates the
material, corporeal, sensible, ‘natural’ to the feminine, and the
spiritual, ideal, intelligible, transcendental to the masculine” (1991, p.
149). Whitford (1991) agrees with Irigaray in saying that we cannot
have an ethics of sexual difference without addressing the symbolic
division that remains unexamined within the symbolic and social
realms.
As a consequence of having to bear the “negative” aspects
involved in reproducing the symbolic order, women achieve
“transcendence” differently from men. By bearing the ‘negative’ aspect
of the division, the price paid by woman is losing her place within the
symbolic order. Thus she is “located” only in the margins, relegated to
“lower” functions – functions associated with the body.
Transcendence, a higher function and a prerogative of the male is
achieved by overcoming the sensible, the lower function that is
allocated to the female. In her essay, “Any theory of the ‘Subject’ has
always been appropriated by the ‘Masculine’,” Irigaray (1985a)
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captures the inevitable flight of the male who is severed/severs
himself from the corporeal. The female on the other hand – always
already embodied – seems to transcend by a sort of “re-tour.” She
states:
Rising to a perspective that would dominate the
totality, to the vantage point of greatest power, he
thus cuts himself off from the bedrock, from his
empirical relationship with the matrix that he
claims to survey. To specularize and to speculate.
Exiling himself ever further (toward) where the
greatest power lies, he thus becomes the ‘sun’…a
pole of attraction stronger than the ‘earth.’
Meanwhile, the excess in this universal fascination
is that ‘she’ also turns upon herself, that she knows
how to re-turn (upon herself) but not how to seek
outside for identity within the other: nature, sun,
God…(woman). As things now go, man moves away
in order to preserve his stake in the value of his
representation, while woman counterbalances with
the permanence of a (self)recollection which is
unaware of itself as such. (1985a, 133-4)
Thus, according to Irigaray, men and women achieve transcendence
very differently. Within the operations of a phallic economy, Irigaray
points out that the woman acts as a mirror and a base/earth. Man
presses down/re-presses the woman to enable him to launch off, to
take flight, to achieve transcendence. Irigaray describes woman’s effort
at transcendence as a “re-turn upon herself.” I will revisit this image
of woman re-turning to herself in this chapter, in the context of
discussing Irigaray’s notion of the two lips. For now, it suffices to say
that for women, the price paid by them for being used as the launch
pad from which man projects himself into an “identity” is that access
to transcendence is denied to her and (as Whitford observes), “she
must always be for-men, available for their transcendence” (1991, p.
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153). Ironically, this configuration of sexual difference can be as
harmful for men as it is for women. Whitford suggests, “Man may
think he is active, dynamic, propelling himself upwards from earth to
sky, but he is in a sepulchre, while woman, like Antigone, is
imprisoned and buried alive” (1991, p. 157).
Within this phallic economy, death, experienced as annihilation,
dissolution, and nothingness is also relegated to the woman. Simply
put, man negotiates his own otherness (negative) by projecting it onto
his “other half” (woman) to hold or contain his otherness for him. In
this way, the phallic economy of sexual relations perpetuates the
forgetting of the problematic of sexual difference. In this context,
Irigaray proposes a redistribution of functions and tasks that
acknowledges sexual difference. In other words, Irigaray believes that
a symbolic redistribution would necessitate that man appropriate his
otherness, and that woman have access to transcendence in her own
terms. This also means that man seeking transcendence will have to
seek a different “g[r]o[un]d” that takes into account his own body. In
other words, his divine needs to change; this would allow him to
appropriate his own body, his otherness. If woman ceases to be the
ground from which he would ascend, then he would have to
renegotiate the terms and conditions of his own transcendence. Just
as man needs to renegotiate his ‘movements’ within the symbolic
order, woman as subject will have to find navigational strategies that
are in consonance with her female subjectivity. In the next section, I
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will explain how woman as ‘other of the other’ can/could renegotiate
her path to transcendence.

3.4 The sensible transcendental as horizon
If woman is to be realized as an ‘other of the other’ then she
should also have an ideal that is specific to her own ontological status.
In this context, Irigaray’s proposition that women have their own “god”
makes more sense. Irigaray’s purpose in introducing the divine in
relation to sexual difference purports a dual function: 1) “of providing
a non-restrictive horizon for identity,” (Whitford, 1991, p. 141) and 2)
“binding the violence of the social body” (Whitford, 1991, p. 141). In
what follows, I will explain how the two functions are in consonance
with sexual difference.
Following the nineteenth-century German philosopher Ludwig
Feuerbach’s arguments for mankind’s need for a God, Irigaray
proposes a need for women to be linked to a divine horizon or a
transcendent dimension. As stated earlier, she argues that women are
excluded from the transcendental realm because of how they are
positioned within the symbolic. Man, by appropriating transcendental
functions and relegating sensible and corporeal functions to woman
perpetuate this symbolic distribution of functions and tasks. To deal
with the correlative disjunction or internal split that women
experience within themselves, Irigaray introduces a third term – the
sensible transcendental.
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The sensible transcendental as a divine dimension recognizes
the need for “[a] body … symbolized in such a way that women are no
longer sole guardians of the corporeal, so that men can incorporate
their own corporeality into their sublimations, so that women can
sublimate as women” (Whitford, 1991, p. 142). The sensible
transcendental, would force us, for instance, to reconsider the
traditional division of labor in reproduction and childrearing normally
validated by the construction of sexual opposition. The corporeal
comes into play here as women take on chores like cooking, cleaning,
doing dishes, etc.; tasks that get reinforced by statements made by
men like, “They (mothers) are better at those things than we are.” A
more egalitarian and/or reciprocal sharing of this labor would be one
possible avenue for man and woman to come to terms with their
corporeal otherness based on the acknowledgement of sexual
difference. The sensible transcendental as a third term that would help
bring these oppositions into play, both at the imaginary and the
symbolic realms, such that “each sex will be able to assume its own
divisions, its own negativity, and its own death” (Whitford, 1991, p.
122). This divine ideal (the sensible transcendental) is also relevant as
it would help women assert their female specificity without fear of
being incorporated by the male version of the divine. Irigaray asserts:
Woman has no mirror wherewith to become woman.
Having a God and becoming one’s gender go hand
in hand. God is the other that we absolutely cannot
be without. In order to become, we need some
shadowy perception of achievement; not a fixed
objective, not a One postulated to be immutable but
rather a cohesion and a horizon that assures us the
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passage between past and future, the bridge of a
present that remembers, that is not sheer oblivion
and loss, not a crumbling away of existence, a
failure, simply, to take note. (1993c, p. 67)
Having a God is akin to having a mirror, suggesting an alternative
imaginary for women. This notion of “God” as mirror however, is
different in the traditional Eurocentric/Judeo-Christian notion of God.
The traditional notion of God is male (Father/Son/Holy Spirit) and
stands for the possession of/and representative of an inaccessible
transcendence. Irigaray proposes an alternative notion of “god” for
women as the (patriarchal) theological notion of God is impoverished
in relation to the feminine gender. She remarks:
Our theological tradition presents some difficulty as
far as God in the feminine gender is concerned.
There is no woman God, no female trinity: mother,
daughter, spirit. This paralyzes the infinite of
becoming a woman since she is fixed in the role of
mother through whom the son of God is made flesh.
(Irigaray, 1993c, p. 62)
Instead, she suggests:
If she is to become woman, if she is to accomplish
her female subjectivity, woman needs a god who is
a figure for the perfection of her subjectivity…a
female god who can open the perspective in which
[her] flesh can be transfigured. (Irigaray, 1993c, p.
64)
Whitford (1991) summarizes concisely the characteristics of this
divine dimension/horizon as postulated by Irigaray: “(1) corporeal; (2)
sexuate, either male or female; (3) subject to becoming; (4) multiple;
(5) incarnated in us here and now” (p. 144). Whitford predicts that
when this corporeal image of the divine (which is non-prescriptive) is
integrated into the current economy, there will be space created for
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women and men to experience autonomy and responsibility.
Undoubtedly, women will have a home in the symbolic. Along with the
above benefits, there is a realistic possibility of an (ethical) relation
between man and woman. In this context, Whitford observes, “It
allows for the possibility of seeing her (Irigaray) as another woman,
instead of as an ideal or bad mother, and therefore of relating to her
work rather than simply swallowing it whole or rejecting it altogether”
(1991, pp. 144-145).
Irigaray posits that the divine dimension not only offers up an
alternate language for subjectivity, but also serves as a paradigm for
the regulation of violence and creating of cohesion in society
(Whitford, 1991, pp. 144-145). To explicate this, I will follow closely
how Irigaray utilizes the analysis and observations of the
contemporary philosopher-anthropologist René Girard. Girard (1977)
describes the historical role of religion in regulating violence in society
through the ritual act of sacrifice and its underlying mechanism of
“scapegoating.” For instance, he points out how the sacrificial
ceremonies of the Dinkas as recorded by the ethnologist Godfrey
Lienhardt takes place to help with regulating aggression:
From time to time somebody detaches himself from
the group to beat the cow or calf that has been tied
to a nearby stake, or to hurl insults at it. There is
nothing static or stilted about the performance; it
succeeds in giving shape to a collective impulse that
gradually triumphs over the forces of dispersion
and discord by bringing corporate violence to bear
on a ritual victim…. The ritualistic mentality
imagines that this death will result in benefits too
great to be ascribed to a simple punitive measure.
(pp. 97-98)
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Irigaray notes a parallel between Girard’s understanding of the
mechanism of scapegoating and the Freudian phallic model of
sexuality. She remarks that the functioning of sacrifice in the
regulation of aggression corresponds to the “masculine model of
sexuality described by Freud: tension, discharge, return to
homeostasis, etc” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 76). In this context, it is also
worth noting Whitford’s observations regarding how Irigaray
deconstructs Girard’s failure to mention one historical sacrifice,
common to most cultures, namely, the sacrifice associated with
motherhood. Whitford remarks, “Relations between men and women
are paralyzed because society does not recognize this initial sacrifice,
does not acknowledge the debt which it owes to mothers” (1991, p.
145). The initial and almost invisible sacrifice made by women allows
for social productivity. This sacrifice is usually underpaid or unpaid
female labor. Irigaray (1993c) remarks:
No social body can be constituted, developed, or
renewed without female labor; without the cathartic
function of the beloved mistress or wife, the
reproductive function of the mother, the life-giving
and caretaking function of the housewife and nurse.
This failure to recognize or remember establishes
the sacrificial rite or rhythm. (p. 86)
Irigaray (1993c) proposes a different model of regulating
aggression and building cohesion at the interpersonal level. Her model
is informed by her practice of psychoanalysis as well as by observing
Eastern cultures. Instead of sacrifice, she suggests using words to
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symbolize affect, being attentive to the present and being respectful of
the rhythms of nature. In her own words:
Thus one achieves ethical, social, and
religious being by attending to the season, the time
of day, the passing moment, and honoring the living
order, rather than destroying it, although
destruction itself is part of the great natural cycles
and tends to signal growth and a new beginning.
(1993c, p. 77)
Irigaray (1993c) also observes that the “sacrificial order overlays the
natural rhythms with a different and cumulative temporality that
dispenses and prevents us from attending to the moment. Once this
occurs imprecisions multiply and grow. A catharsis becomes
necessary” (p. 77). The current war in Iraq maintained by the sacrifice
of many young lives prevents the US from attending to the sociopolitical scene with its various crises – environmental, economic,
health care, etc. Sacrifices, rituals and catharsis become necessary
when we fail to be respectful of nature and its cycles. But, Irigaray is
careful not to reify these either, they are also changing, in flux.
Being attentive to the present means being attentive to the body.
Being attentive to the body means to be attuned to the information
from one’s senses. Being attentive to the senses requires a focus on
the present and not in the past or the future; however, even here
Irigaray warns us that we need to be cautious about privileging the
visual over the other senses. Irigaray clarifies, “Vision is effectively a
sense that can totalize, enclose, in its own way. More than the other
senses, it is likely to construct a landscape, a horizon” (1993a, p.
175). In contrast to a visual experience of space that tends to
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construct an enclosure and master, the tactile has a different
experience of spatiality. In touch, the person experiences the world in
the moment and decision-making with regard to movement is not an
automatic and habitual process but requires mindfulness and
creativity. In paying attention to the moment we are called upon to be
more attentive to the present than to the future or the past. Whitford
(1991) also observes that attending to the present can be conceptually
linked to both linguistic theory and theology. In relation to linguistic
theory, attending to the present suggests being present to the subject
of enunciation and the sexuate identity of the person. In relation to
theology, the link is to the parousia or the Second coming. Irigaray
states:
Does parousia correspond to the expectation of a
future not only as a utopia or a destiny but also as
a here and now, the willed construction of bridge in
the present between the past and the future? ...
Why do we assume that God must always remain
an inaccessible transcendence rather than a
realization – here and now – in and through the
body? (1993a, p. 147-8)
Irigaray’s rethinking of sacrifice in religion reaffirms the image of the
divine as embodied and immanent and simultaneously transcendent,
thus offering a different ideal for woman in her becoming a subject.
The correlation of the divine and attentiveness to the present is offered
then as an alternate path to regulating violence and building social
cohesion and order.
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3.5 Construction materials for a feminine imaginary
A feminine imaginary would take into account “the morphology
of the female body and her relationship to the ground, to the mirror, to
space and time, and to dwelling” (Whitford, 1991, p. 159). The
categories that Irigaray proposes constitute the “construction
materials” for the invention of a language that would house woman in
consonance with her morphology. Irigaray’s invented categories do not
substitute for the categories that house the male. Rather, her
categories resonate with the task of woman-becoming-subject. We can
say that these categories stand on their own because they do not
represent the “other of the same,” rather they represent “the other of
the other.”
The categories or terms Irigaray proposes not only take into
account women’s morphology; they also act as mediators between the
binary oppositions. Irigaray introduces many categories. I would like
to name a prominent few: the threshold (a space for woman to move
freely within and without), the mucous (neither liquid nor solid,
something yet to be theorized, like sexual difference), the angel (a
mediator that carries the message that the human can become divine).
I have already addressed one very important term, the sensible
transcendental in the previous section.
An important implication of using new construction materials is
that there will be positive changes in many areas of a woman’s life,
but particularly in the area of communication between the sexes.
“Dialogue” requires two sexually different subjects to engage in a
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conversation. Also, decisions cannot be made about the other and for
the other. The playing field and the rules will have changed. Whitford
remarks, “What it does mean is that the other sex – the other woman –
has an imaginary and symbolic existence, so that she cannot be
incorporated any longer without awareness or acknowledgment”
(1991, p. 166). Women will have to be included in decision making for
them or about them and they will not be ignored or subsumed in
dialogue.
In this concluding section I will elaborate the term “two lips”
that Irigaray offers as another construction material for building a
new symbolic. An understanding of this category/term would enhance
the creation of a sexually different subject. In her essay, “When Our
Lips Speak Together,” Irigaray (1985b) asserts, “We are not lacks,
voids awaiting sustenance, plenitude, fulfillment from the other. By
our lips we are women: this does not mean that we are focused on
consuming, consummation, fulfillment” (pp. 209-210). Irigaray uses
the image of the lips as a metonymic strategy. That is, to evoke
associations of meaning of what is signified. Here, lips as a metonymic
device evoke associations that would resonate with woman as a
sexuate being.
To unpack the complexity of the image of the two lips, I am
utilizing Maggie Berg’s “alternative reading of Irigaray’s lips” (1991, p.
51). Berg begins her reading by stating that she wants to read
“Irigaray’s lips as a counterpart to Lacan’s phallus” (p. 51) and to
resolve the apparent contradictions that the image of the two lips
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evokes in critics. Critics have read it literally and also as a discursive
strategy. The literal reading reads the two lips as creating an essence
or definition of women’s identity. I would agree with Berg that such a
reading is faulty for many reasons. First, as Irigaray herself points out
the lips do not suggest a regression to anatomy. She chooses the two
lips for its ambiguity. Besides, biology and/or nature are also
mediated categories. So the lips are always already situated within a
cultural understanding. Berg also states that for Irigaray, the words,
“lips” and “speak” evoke images that refer simultaneously to both
sexuality and discourse respectively, meaning “the two cannot and
should not be separated, because one always implies the other” (Berg,
1991, p. 56). Berg also points out that Irigaray avoids the trap of
phallocentrism by not presenting the lips to displace the phallus;
instead she offers them up as in a play of différance, whereby the lips
“oscillate between signifier and signified” (Berg, 1991, p. 57), not
contained by any one term. In other words, Berg concludes that in
contrast to Lacan’s phallus, Irigaray’s lips cannot be pinned down to
either anatomy or language. In this context, she argues that in the
case of Lacan, it is almost impossible for the phallus not to be linked
to anatomy. Grosz raises similar suspicions regarding Lacan’s phallus.
She observes, “In spite of Lacan’s claims, the phallus is not a ‘neutral’
term functioning equally for both sexes, positioning them both in the
symbolic order. As the word suggests, it is a term privileging
masculinity, or rather, the penis” (1990, p. 122). In her conclusion,
Berg states that “Irigaray’s text makes the signified (what goes on in
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our heads when we read the lips) so rich in connotation that it
actually transforms the anatomical referent” (1991, p. 70).
Like Berg, Whitford’s (1991) reading of the “two lips” is based on
seeing the lips as denoting a relationship of metonymy or contiguity
rather than a metaphorical (and hierarchical) relationship between
binary oppositions. Contiguity refers to an association of meaning
within a context whereas metaphor refers to a substitution of meaning
based on a socio-linguistic code. Whitford (1991) remarks that Irigaray
does not use metaphors to address the motif of woman. Rather, she
uses metonymy to talk about the two lips as well as other categories.
She writes, “Whereas the paternal genealogy is based on metaphoric
identification, the maternal genealogy is, or could be based on
metonymic identification” (Whitford, 1991, p. 180). A maternal
genealogy that is based on metonymical identifications would allow for
mother and daughter to coexist and relate as subjects rather than
subjects and objects. Within the paternal genealogy, the woman would
relate to the mother as an object. Also, for Irigaray, the lips, unlike the
phallus, act as threshold. As threshold, the lips cannot be substituted
or exchanged. Woman’s place cannot be taken by others. In her essay,
“Gesture in Psychoanalysis,” (1993c) Irigaray refers to the lips in
contrast to the “fort-da” as a substitutional mechanism used by the
male to control and master their relations with others. She writes,
“The fort-da is already a substitutional mechanism, whereas the lips
are the woman herself, the threshold to a woman that has not been
distanced by any object” (1993c, p. 102). The lips as threshold do not
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control, master or manipulate. As a rich and associative signified, the
lips respect the mystery of the radical other.
In the next chapter, I address the existential phenomenological
psychology of Ernesto Spinelli. I outline the salient points that
constitute his theory and praxis. I will show how his therapeutic
praxis is oblivious to the question of sexual difference.
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Chapter 4
The existential phenomenological psychology
of Ernesto Spinelli
A theory may require that we revise even the
descriptions of the world on which the theory
itself is based.
- Alison Jaggar,
Feminist Politics and Human Nature, p. 381
The phenomenological account of the lived body
and the lived world needs to be complemented
by the awareness that there is an interaction
between the lived experience, the imaginary,
and the discursive and social construction of
both.
- Margaret Whitford,
Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, p. 152.

4.1 Introduction
Ernesto Spinelli is both a practicing existential psychotherapist
and an academic. He is known for his development of the “selfconstruct,” his emphasis on the inter-relational dimension of the
psychotherapeutic relationship, and the clarification of the intersubjective factors that underlie an existential theory of human
sexuality.
Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy is a product of the tradition
of European existentialism and phenomenology. Spinelli’s articulation
of existential psychotherapy is indebted to the existential
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phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger,
Maurice-Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre (Spinelli, 2001; Spinelli,
2004). For example, Spinelli suggests ways to resolve human conflict
based on Sartre’s phenomenological exploration of the “gaze of the
other” (Spinelli, 2004, p. 58). Using Heidegger’s understanding of
language as transformative versus representational, Spinelli (2001)
articulates the link between language and art. He remarks, “We suffer
our artistic endeavours, just as we suffer language, in order that both
we and the world may be revealed and transformed” (2001, p. 137).
Last but not least, Spinelli’s attempts to “reconfigure human
sexuality” are directly influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of
the body as the “vehicle of being-in-the-world and a basic form of the
appearance (manifestation) of the world itself” (2001, p. 82).
In this chapter, I will review Spinelli’s theory of existential
psychotherapy, especially the features that are relevant to sexual
difference. I will detail his “inter-relational” approach which, while
clinically nuanced enough to represent an advance, fails to examine
the theoretical and practical consequences of sexual difference.

4.2 The existential psychotherapy of Ernesto Spinelli
Although Spinelli calls himself an “existential psychotherapist,”
he does not distinguish his practice and thinking from what he
identifies as “the enterprise of phenomenological enquiry” (2006, p. 2).
He observes that its primary task is to “illuminate and disclose the
make-up, or way of being, of any given structure in its form of
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meaning” (2006, p. 2). He writes, “Indeed it is my contention that we
can consider existential psychotherapy as an expression of
phenomenological research in terms of its shared aims, methods of
enquiry and, perhaps most significantly, its values in general and
specifically its values regarding inter-relatedness” (2006, p. 2).
Consequently, as an existential psychotherapist, Spinelli believes
client issues (dilemmas, disorders, disturbances, and so on) “originate
from, and are embodied expressions of, the client’s ongoing overall
interpersonal relations” (2006, p. 2). In his discussion of the intersubjective realm, he also uses other terms (like, “interpersonal,”
and/or “inter-relational”) to mean the same. Psychoanalysis had its
own “inter-relational” and/or “inter-subjective” turn, initiated around
the latter half of the 20th century (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002;
Sullivan, 1953). Briefly, psychoanalysis shifted its focus from paying
attention to the intra-psychic reality of the analysand to his/her intersubjective reality. These psychoanalysts did not forget the intrapsychic dimension, however, but saw it as part of the inter-subjective.
Practitioners of existential psychotherapy do not attempt the
removal or “symptom reduction” of clients’ “problematic” thoughts,
behaviors, and affects. Instead, Spinelli asserts:
[T]ogether with the client, they attempt to expose
and consider these symptoms as interrelated
expressions of the client’s wider ‘way of being’ so
that the implications of their maintenance,
reduction or removal for that ‘way of being’ can be
considered and evaluated. (2006, p. 3)
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4.3 Salient features of Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy
4. 3. 1 The self-construct as an alternative to the concept of self
Like many theorists in his tradition, Spinelli begins with a
critique of the Western notion of the self. He delineates several
assumptions about self that “permeate as a whole or in part our
psychological theories, our sociopolitical laws and precepts, our moral
and ethical codes” (2001, p. 39). Subsequent attempts at defining the
self have been nothing but the “permutation” of these assumptions
(2001, p. 40) and remain problematic and not attuned to lived
experience. In this context, Spinelli states that contemporary social
scientists’ observations show that when we attempt to define
something elusive, we use metaphorical language “to provide a
(supposed) clarity to that which remains mysterious” (2001, p. 40). As
he points out, metaphors are often culturally over-determined and
limited in scope, so their use comes with a price. Spinelli claims that
“If metaphors allow us to ‘see’, they do so by framing the boundaries
both of what is seen and how it is seen” (2001, p. 41). Spinelli himself
uses a metaphor of a mirror to suggest how metaphors constrain
meaning. He explains, “If every metaphor provides a mirror, it also
provides a hammer with which to demolish all other potential mirrors
that, placed at different angles, would provoke competing or
contradictory transformative metaphors” (2001, p. 41).
Instead of the ambiguous and problematic term “self” to
describe what it means to be human, Spinelli proposes “selfconstruct” or “self-structure” as alternatives. He observes that
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although the term “self-construct” operates metaphorically, it retains
the “fluid, process-like experience of being human” (2001, p. 47)
rather than the static “thing-like” entity implied by “self.” This shift in
terminology allows for holding contradictory beliefs simultaneously.
Spinelli explains, “Indeed, this very incapacity to define the
constituents of the self-structure in any final or fixed sense seems to
me to be the crux of any movement towards what may be labelled
authenticity” (2001, p. 53). His characterization of the term “selfconstruct” suggests a parallel in meaning to Irigaray’s fluid-like
structure of femininity. The difference however, is that Spinelli’s “selfconstruct” is founded on the assumptions of a mono-sexual economy.
4. 3. 2 The existential psychotherapist’s role as “attendant” and
“other”
Spinelli notes that psychotherapy “has increasingly tended to
become an ally of dominant cultural assumptions rather than one of
culture’s most trenchant critics” (2001, p. 18). The therapist’s allying
him- or herself with normative assumptions regarding what it is to be
human means that aspects of the therapist’s or client’s world that are
inconsistent with these assumptions are either excluded or by default
pathologized. By colluding with the status quo, Spinelli observes,
“psychotherapy, however inadvertently, has blunted its socially critical
edge” (2001, p.19). By evicting the world from the consulting room,
psychotherapy has “encased itself within a set of restrictive
interventions” (2001, p. 19) and will continue to stagnate in its
mediocrity.
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To break out of this dismal situation, Spinelli proposes a model
of existential psychotherapy wherein the therapist’s role “shifts from
that of helper, healer and instructor back to its original meaning of
‘attendant’ – one who walks beside you and, through being with you,
illuminates not just your world, but all worlds as well” (2001, p. 20).
As an attendant, the therapist invites the world into the consulting
room and thus “shake(s) psychotherapy out of the hermetically sealed
and arcane confines of the ‘special and exclusive’ relationship between
client and psychotherapist” (2001, p. 19).
Spinelli points out that as an attendant, the existential therapist
also assumes the role of an “other” to the client. As such, the therapist
“acts as a representative of all others in the client’s wider world
relations” (Spinelli, 2007, p. 59). The therapist’s mode of engagement
as “other” is unique. As such, the therapist “may both clarify and
challenge any number of the client’s dispositional stances about how
others are, and how others expect the client to be, and how the client
expects others to be with him or her” (2007, p. 60). Spinelli proposes
that the therapist as an “other” must initially accept the presenting
self-construct of the client; that is, how the client constructs him- or
herself in relation to others.
To clarify this stance of the therapist as “other,” Spinelli utilizes
the insights of Martin Buber, a twentieth-century educator and
philosopher. According to Spinelli, Buber posits two types of intersubjective relations, the I-Thou and the I-It. Spinelli likens his
understanding of the therapist as “other” to Buber’s I-Thou relation
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which promotes an “inclusive” otherness rather than the “objectifying”
I-It relations. Spinelli characterizes the I-Thou relation as based on
reciprocity rather than empathy. Spinelli explains:
As Buber viewed it, empathy requires the therapist
to treat the client as merely another version of ‘I’
and, thus, stays attuned only to a projected image
of him or her self, thereby remaining unwilling to
include the otherness of the client within the
therapeutic stance. As a consequence, the client’s
response to the therapist’s empathy is to continue
to experience the therapist as an unrelated ‘other’.
If the I-It attitude is grounded in an insistence upon
the separateness of ‘the other’, the I-Thou attitude
promotes a reciprocity or meeting between each
‘other’. The former equally objectifies both the ‘I’
and the ‘It’. The latter reveals that both ‘I’ and
‘Thou’ co-exist as inseparable poles of interrelation.
(2007, p. 112)
Some of the qualities that shape an existential therapist based on
reciprocity are reflection, challenge, and making explicit what is
implicit.
The following therapeutic interaction, between Spinelli and
Elizabeth, a thirty-two-year-old terminally ill with lung cancer,
illustrates how he applied his theory:
‘Am I in denial?’ Elizabeth asks. ‘Am I acting
as though it will just go away? That I’ll wake up and
find that this has been just another nightmare?
‘Are you?’ I ask back. ….
Elizabeth gazes at me, intrigued and
exasperated by my prodding. She … agrees to
humour me. ‘When I die,’ she states, ‘I want others
to say that I took care of myself. Isn’t that absurd?’
‘And if you didn’t? I say. ‘If you stopped
taking care of your body and the others recognized
this. Then what?’
‘I couldn’t stand it. I’d be betraying my own
principles.’
‘And to live up to your principles, even at the
point of your dying, is of vital importance to you.’
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‘Yes. Yes, I suppose it is.’
‘Even if, as you said earlier, it’s all
meaningless.’
My comment shakes her. (Spinelli, 1997, p. 192)
While Spinelli is undoubtedly compassionate in his approach to
Elizabeth, he also maintains a relationship of I-Thou with her as
evidenced in his strategies of dialogical interaction. By differentiating
between the I-Thou and I-It relations, Spinelli outlines qualities that a
therapist as “other” should possess. The therapist should be willing:
[To] be with the client (i.e. to respect the client’s way
of being as valid and meaningful) and to be for the
client (i.e. to attempt entry into the client’s way of
being in order to clarify its underlying values,
beliefs, and so forth). (1997, p. 89)
For instance, in the vignette presented above, Spinelli demonstrates
respect when he chooses not to provide Elizabeth with answers to her
queries regarding whether she was in denial; instead, he turns the
question back to her in an effort to be with her as she struggles to
clarify it for herself. In sum, the existential psychotherapist as “other”
acts as a presence and an impact that challenges the current selfconstruct of the client with respect and openness.
4. 3. 3 The dialogical realms of encounter
In his practice, Spinelli attempts to address three dialogical
realms of therapeutic encounter: “the I-focused, you-focused and wefocused” (2006, p. 3). These dialogical realms are understood as
possible ways of being within a therapeutic encounter. Briefly stated,
the I-focused realm is one in which the therapist works to clarify the
experience of being him- or herself in the therapeutic relationship; the
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you-focused realm is one in which the therapist works to clarify the
therapist’s experience of the client’s experience of the therapist; and
the we-focused realm is one in which the therapist works to clarify
both participants’ experience of each other. Spinelli states that since
the “we-focused realm of encounter is characterized by its immediacy”
(2006, p. 3), the therapist places a premium on this realm so that the
therapist “can attempt to ‘enter’, with increasing adequacy, the
currently lived-world of the client” (2006, p. 3). The third dialogical
realm can be justified as more immediate than the others, based on
the fact that “immediacy re-connects that which is being stated with the
being who is making the statement” (Spinelli, 2007, p.132). Focusing
on the third realm’s experiential component, the existential
psychotherapist aims for a “real and valid” interaction between himself
and his client because of its potential to be unmediated and present.
He explains:
The existential psychotherapist’s willingness to
examine and consider what emerges experientially
through this realm as being real and valid (rather
than substitutive, symbolic, or ‘transferential’)
serves to implicate his or her current manner of
existence as expressed through the interactive
relationship with the client. This focus further
serves to expose and clarify in the immediacy of the
current encounter the self-same inter-relational
issues that clients express as being deeply
problematic within their wider world relations.
(2007, p. 132)
The underlying belief is that the “immediacy of the current
encounter” is crucial as it provides a microcosmic view of the client’s
wider way of being in the world.
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Spinelli also discusses a fourth inter-relational realm, viz., the
they-focused realm. This encompasses the others of the client’s world
and their views of his or her way of being. Spinelli notes that this
realm is highly significant when the client begins to consider
“alternative ‘ways to be’” (2007, p. 4). For instance, a client (an inmate
in jail) in the course of therapy stated the following: “Last Saturday,
when I saw my daughter during visitation, I believe that she feels that
she must blame herself in some way.” The statement is an indication
that the client is beginning to consider other ways to be as he begins
to view his situation from others’ perspective.
4. 3. 4 Body and sexuality as inter-relational
Spinelli acknowledges his indebtedness to Merleau-Ponty’s
understanding of the body and sexuality. Based on his close reading
of Merleau-Ponty, Spinelli considers the body to be not a thing among
other things but that which “expresses a unique dialogue with the
world” (2001, p. 82). The body also “reflect(s) our way of projecting
towards the world and our responses to the world’s projecting of itself
towards us” (1997, p. 187). In this sense, the body is inter-relational.
Spinelli’s own understanding of sexuality is consonant with MerleauPonty’s in which sexual encounters are seen as “a pivotal means with
which to express our presence to ‘the other’ and, in turn, to express
the presence of ‘the other’ to ourselves” (2001, p. 82). He claims that
Merleau-Ponty is not interested “in the issues of male or female
sexuality, sexual orientation or the sociopolitical dimensions of
sexuality” (2001, p. 82), but rather in sexuality “as it is revealed in its
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inter-relational dimensions” (2001, p. 83). Spinelli’s gloss (which I will
address in the next section) of Merleau-Ponty’s account of sexuality is
significant, both in relation to his account of the therapeutic process
and the role of sexual difference therein.
To sum up, Spinelli’s existential therapy respects the intersubjective dimension and is in line with the sound principles of
existential phenomenological psychology. For instance, his strategy of
exploring and clarifying the client’s world with respect and openness
is evidence of his in-depth understanding of existential
phenomenology. His non-recognition of the question of sexual
difference however, is shown in his unexamined assumptions
regarding the foundation of inter-subjectivity. I will examine his key
concepts as seen in his theory and practice and show how the
exclusion of the question of sexual difference mars his own attempt at
not becoming an ally of the “dominant cultural assumptions” (2001, p.
18).

4.4 Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy vis-à-vis sexual
difference
Spinelli describes existential-phenomenological theory as
underscoring “that our experience of living is never certain, never fully
predictable, never secure” (1997, p. 6), but that we can choose to
respond to this uncertainty in a myriad of ways. Even choosing not to
choose is a choice. He adds that, whatever the response, it itself
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“expresses the stance we take toward our relations with the world”
(1997, p. 6). For instance, when a client reports that he declined an
offer to smoke marijuana, his choice expresses his stance towards his
relations with himself and others: his stance towards his own health
(perhaps to breathe clean air and to prolong his existence), his
psychological well-being (not to be conditioned by a habit and/or not
to lose motivation), and towards others (being secure enough to stand
on his own).
From the perspective of existential phenomenology, if our
responses reveal the stance we take towards our relations with the
world, how do they reveal our sexually differentiated position? As
regards others, how do they reveal our acknowledgment of a sexually
different other? Would not our responses reveal a different stance at a
fundamental level based on our specific sexuality? In other words, if
our response (as being-in-the-world) is always already subtended by
sexual difference, then our response to the uncertain and the
unknown is going to be different, given that we are man and woman,
two sexually different subjects.
Sexual difference, however, is not salient in Spinelli’s
understanding of the workings of inter-subjectivity. Perhaps this is
not surprising, given that sexual difference is rarely addressed within
the existential-phenomenological tradition. This fact is acknowledged
by Spinelli’s peers, Emmy van Deurzen and Raymond Kenward (2005)
who state:
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There is much in the area of sexuality that
existential theorists have yet to consider. For
instance, to be sexual is to be differentiated from
the other sex, and to be sexual is to be incomplete
(men and women are each half of the reproductive
process). There is an opportunity to analyse what it
means to be a man, what it means to be a woman,
to examine maternity and paternity, childbearing
and the experience of childbirth, and men’s
presence and absence in procreation, of
relationships with the same-sex and opposite-sex
parents, of homosexuality, bi-sexuality,
masturbation, of rape (violence is always a
possibility in human relationships), and of the
relationship between sex and love. (Van Deurzen &
Kenward, 2005, p. 185)
Although the authors contend that there is a lack of discussion of
sexual difference within existential phenomenology, their own remarks
are problematic. For instance, their idea that “to be sexual is to be
incomplete” carries a normative assumption that men and women are
complementary. Also, the statement “men and women are each half of
the reproductive process” assumes that gay parents could not be part
of the reproductive and familial process.
Spinelli claims that the existential therapist takes the position
of “the other” in psychotherapy. Briefly, as an “other,” the therapist
will stand in as the representative of all the others in the client’s
world. By claiming to be able to stand on two sides of a divide, Spinelli
assumes a reciprocal relation by which the therapist can stand in for
the other. But as long as a “culture of the relationship between
genders” (Irigaray, 2000, p. 91) is not spelled out in qualitative terms,
Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy runs the risk of reducing the other
to the status of the same. Irigaray (2000) herself characterizes inter-
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subjectivity as the positive outcome of the acknowledgment of sexual
difference:
The difference between woman and man allows for
an inter-subjectivity that wouldn’t subject the one
and the other to nature, to the same, to the equal,
to imperatives, to laws, to their external realities.
This requires that the one and the other recognize
their own limits in that they belong to only one
gender. To be a woman means not to be a man and
to be a man means not to be a woman. This not
becomes an instrument and a place for each
person’s identity and a creative, and not only
procreative, intentional relationship between the
two to be established. Being able to identify with the
other seems to me an ambiguous cultural
improvement. (2000, p. 91)
From the perspective of sexual difference, Spinelli’s therapeutic
implementation of what he calls “reciprocity” is naive. In Irigaray’s
book I love to you, she explains the insertion of the linking proposition
“to” into the verb in the following manner: “I love to you means I
maintain a relation of indirection to you. I do not subjugate you or
consume you. I respect you (as irreducible)” (1996, p. 109). But the IThou relation that Spinelli advocates is characterized by a relation of
reciprocity that does not take into account sexual difference. In this
sense, his I-Thou relation characterizes the other as an “other of the
same” and not as an “other of the other.” So for instance, “woman”
within the I-Thou economy of relations is simply an “other” (an “other
of the same”) and not radically different.
Based on Irigaray’s deconstruction of Western religion, the IThou relation can be situated as mirroring man-God relations. Within
this model, the Thou implies the monotheistic male God. Irigaray
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makes explicit what is implicit in the evocation of the other or the
Thou in inter-subjective relations:
In the history of our culture, there’s much talk of I.
Thou (Tu) and the other are also evoked – whether
with reference to my neighbor or to a totally other
God, the Thou of certain philosophers or a theology
that forgets that this you (tu) is generally a he. But
these I’s and you’s, which seem self-evident within
the bounds of a delimited field, remain vague and
abstract. We only have to talk about the concrete
existence of living men and women for us to falter
over the question of who is this I and who is you. Do
you love me? the woman says to the man. I wonder
if I am loved, he replies. How can we be formed,
then? (1996, p. 48)
Whitford concurs, offering a corrective to a mono-sexual economy via
Irigaray’s notion of the sensible transcendental:
The Other has always been seen by men as God,
but never as the other sex. The ‘You’ is always
addressed to the transcendental, never to women.
With a sensible transcendental, the exchange
between the ‘you’ and the ‘I’ could take place in the
here and now, with each sex assuming its own ‘I’
and addressing its ‘you’ to a transcendent other.
(1991, 147)
By not addressing the phallocentric economy of relations,
Spinelli, a strong proponent of inter-subjectivity, inadvertently
colludes with its assumptions. His other, is a substitutable other.
That is, woman as other is a reflection, a complement, an opposite to
man. By assuming sameness within an inter-relational realm,
communication between two subjects cannot be considered dialogical.
As Irigaray observes:
This dialogical relation between man and woman …
remains to be invented, almost entirely from
scratch. It represents an important stage in human
civilization that has yet to be accomplished. It
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requires man and woman to be faithful to their
gender and to start communicating from their
differences, and not get rid of them. (2000, p. 85)
Spinelli’s assumption of a sexually neutral other also affects his
understanding of the body as expressing a “unique dialogue with the
world” (1997, p. 187). In one of his eight stories of existential therapy
(Tales of Un-knowing), Spinelli (1997) describes his work with a
teenage girl named Amanda and her relationship to her body. Her
presenting issue can be summed up as not liking herself, in particular
her body. During the course of therapy, Spinelli and Amanda come to
recognize how she had come to disown her body, and to understand
how this manifested itself in her relationships with others and herself.
According to Spinelli, her recognition of disowning her body opened up
for her the gradual possibility of re-owning her body and accepting its
power to control others, as well as the possibility of accepting the need
to let go of her attempts to control her body.
Spinelli’s analysis of Amanda’s self-construct as a struggle in
terms of her body vis-à-vis her lived experience is pertinent. He states:
Her lived experience provided her with contradictory
messages: on the one hand, it told her that it was
not enough to be judged and appreciated simply as
a body. On the other, it demonstrated to her over
and over again that that was precisely the one way
that others did judge and appreciate her. (Spinelli,
1997, p. 50)
His analysis of Amanda’s conflict reveals a problem that reflects the
neglect of sexual difference. In the use of the phrase, “to be judged
and appreciated simply as a body,” Spinelli slips into the traditional
image of the body as a cohesive and coherent phenomenon, a neutral
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entity. But the body is never a neutral or even a cohesive and coherent
phenomenon. It is always already formed through a process of
“internalization of images, representations and signifying practices”
(Grosz, 1989, p. 112). Culturally, women experience being “controlled”
by their bodies according to a sexually specific meaning: for example,
through sexual objectification, subjugation, and rape, but also
pregnancy, menstruation, and the emphasis placed on women’s
appearance. By ignoring the fundamental sexual contouring of the
body, Spinelli falls into the mistake of neutralizing the body and
ignoring the sexual inscriptions on the body.
Amanda’s interpersonal experience in therapy, according to
Spinelli helped her “to begin to re-own that self-same body and change
her relationship to it” (1997, p. 50) which in turn freed her to explore
“novel possibilities, new perspectives” (1997, p. 51). Spinelli tells us
that Amanda “embark(s) upon a series of casual sexual relationships”
(1997, p. 51) and “literally experiment(s) with her body-shape, adding
and losing weight, immersing herself in a life of strenuous exercise or
utmost indolence” (1997, p. 52), eventually reaching a balanced bodyimage. Amanda’s choices towards her body are subtended by what
Irigaray would characterize as a “masculine model of sexuality
described by Freud: tension, discharge, return to homeostasis, etc.”
(1993c, p. 76). Amanda’s stances towards her body seem to progress
according to the law of thermodynamics whereby equilibrium is
reached after an expenditure of energy.
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If for Spinelli the body is neutral and mono-sexual in the sense
delineated above, then how does that affect his understanding of
subjectivity? Spinelli makes certain assumptions regarding
subjectivity through his notions of freedom and transcendence. His
understanding of freedom is inherited from his predecessors –
existential philosophers like Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty
and Jean-Paul Sartre (Spinelli, 1997; 2001). In a pedagogical
description of his praxis entitled “Her Last Breath,” Spinelli walks us
through his encounter with his client Elizabeth (referred to earlier in
this chapter) who is dying from lung cancer. They arrive at an
important juncture in therapy when they clarify her relationship to
her body. Elizabeth states that despite her body betraying her “in
such a total fashion,” she will not betray it. She asserts that when she
dies, she “want(s) others to say that (she) took care of (herself)”
(Spinelli, 1977, p. 193). For Elizabeth, being faithful to her body (even
though, at this time in her life, whatever her body means to her is
slipping away) though apparently meaningless “remains important to
(her), determines what remains of (her) life’s possibilities” (Spinelli,
1997, 193). Spinelli mulls over her statement:
Listening carefully to her words, I wonder
whether this could be a statement of strength.
Certainly, it might be interpreted as such; many
would judge it in this fashion. But I remain
cautious in jumping to this conclusion. I don’t know
whether Elizabeth experiences this principle as
something which she has chosen or which has
imposed itself upon her. The difference between ‘I
can’ and ‘I must’ seems crucial here since while the
former permits openness towards one’s experience
and forgiveness for the imperfect consequences that
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emerge, the latter imposes a stance that rejects all
options save the one deemed ‘correct’ or
‘permissible’ and punishes anything less than
perfection. (1997, p. 193)
Spinelli cautiously considers Elizabeth’s statement regarding her body
and does not want to accept it as a “statement of strength.” He is
unsure whether Elizabeth’s principle about her treatment of her body
is based on a free and conscious choice, meaning “I can,” or whether it
is motivated by her restrictive self-construct “I must,” meaning “I must
be good to my body so that others will …” Spinelli’s task of clarifying
and challenging the client’s self-construct (irrespective of his/her
gender) rests on the idea that a free, transcendent body is that of a
white, male, adult body.
For Spinelli, an “I can” stance of openness towards experience
discounts women’s sexuation. This oversight reflects his own theory of
subjectivity, which only acknowledges one subject, the male. Spinelli
maintains that the “self-construct” is continually challenged in its
inter-relations with others; however, he does not consider the impact
of the socio-cultural inscriptions on the body. In this sense, Spinelli’s
intervention succeeds in keeping the socio-cultural perception of the
body out of the consulting room.
If Spinelli assumes that the subject is sexually neutral, how
does that affect his notion of death anxiety? Spinelli notes that
contemporary Western society tends to expel death and anything
associated with it. He explains, “This expulsion of death as an
inherent feature of life appears to have as its impetus the attempt to
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avoid all confrontation with mystery; it is our effort to eradicate the
fear of the unknown” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 155). For instance, he points
out how in the West the “the cult of youth” (2001, p. 155) has been
elevated to such an extent that cosmetics and plastic surgery are
routinely used to make people look young. In this context, Spinelli
argues that the term “death anxiety” may be misleading. In line with
Heidegger’s thinking, he observes, “It is not death, per se, that
provokes our fears and concerns; rather, it is the recognition of the
fragility of our existence” (1997, p. 9). Spinelli also maintains that how
each one of us deals with death anxiety “is likely to be as varied and
unique as our experience of being alive” (1997, p. 10). His attitude
assumes that both men’s and women’s ways of negotiating death
anxiety are not based on being sexually different but simply on being
human.
According to Spinelli, when dealing with death anxiety or
recognizing our vulnerability as human beings, our response falls
between the two extremes of either sheltering ourselves in a lifestyle
that is “bounded by regime and habit” (1997, p. 10) or abandoning
ourselves into a life of “defiance of security and predictability” (1997,
p. 10). Spinelli’s characterization of the two stances in dealing with
death anxiety evokes metaphors that are reminiscent of the Freudian
model of sexuality: “holding back” (requiring discipline) or “discharge”
(abandonment) – operating according to the two principles of
thermodynamics (tension & discharge) which helps towards returning
of a mechanism to homeostasis (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 115; Irigaray,
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1993c, p. 76). Irigaray contends that the model of thermodynamics to
deal with life’s realities is ill-suited to female sexuality. Instead she
suggests an economy that is “more related to becoming, more attuned
to the time of the universe” (1993b, p. 115). She contends that the
female economy of sexuality will have to take into account “irreversible
events that define the stages of her life” (1993b, p. 115) based on a
different sense of temporality, a temporality related to a different
rhythm, a rhythm that is in consonance with the cosmos.
In the final chapter of The Mirror and the Hammer, Spinelli
(2001) suggests possibilities for existential psychotherapy in a chapter
titled “Towards a more humane psychotherapy.” To make sense of the
complex workings of existential psychotherapy, Spinelli utilizes the
metaphor of chaos theory from contemporary physics. Chaos theory
arose as an alternative model to linear-based models of physics that
used cause and effect to explain outcomes in complex systems.
Spinelli understands chaos theory to hold the view that “the behavior
of complex systems, while clearly not random and unpredictable …
can only begin to be discerned when investigators cease seeking to
place them within the confines of linearly causal analyses” (2001, p.
173). According to Spinelli, the implication of chaos theory for
existential psychotherapy is that “sudden radical linearly irrational
change” (2001, p. 174) is a fundamental given within a complex
system like human behaviors. Like chaos theory, he suggests that
psychotherapy needs to move away from the urge to control and
predict, and “approach matters from the standpoint of a new
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proposition … based, centrally, upon the acceptance of that mutual
revelatory disclosure that is the expression of inter-relational
encounter” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 175). By invoking the metaphor of chaos
theory to understand the complexity of existential psychotherapy,
Spinelli affirms that the inter-relational encounter offers the
possibility for non-linear change.
Irigaray also looks to science for a model, but for one that would
suit female subjectivity. In contrast to the thermodynamic model of
psychoanalysis, Irigaray (2002) subscribes to the contemporary
Belgian physicist Ilya Prigogine’s model of “dissipative structures.” She
explains:
Female sexuality may harmonize better, if we must
evoke a scientific model, with what Prigogine calls
‘dissipative’ structures, which function through
exchange with the outside world, which proceed in
energy states, and whose ordering is based not on
seeking equilibrium, but on crossing thresholds
corresponding to leaving disorder or entropy
behind, without discharge. (Irigaray, 2002, p. 253)
While Spinelli’s reliance on “chaos theory” reaffirms his
understanding of existential psychotherapy as a model that does not
seek linear causal explanations for human behaviors, his
understanding of this model fails to take into account sexual
difference. That is, although the sexuation of human beings do not
“cause” behaviors, they can “in-form” human choices. Ignoring this
can impact what happens within the inter-subjective realm. While the
clients will feel liberated and be open to exploring various novel
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possibilities in their relation to their bodies or others, their underlying
assumptions regarding their subjectivity will remain unchallenged.
Metaphors come in handy again for Spinelli in another
characterization of the inter-relational encounter between the
therapist and the client. Here he utilizes the metaphor of the mirror
and the hammer to frame “the meeting of self with other” (2001,
p.175). Spinelli explains what transpires in the inter-relational
encounter. He states, “Such meetings, like that between mirror and a
hammer, may well be shattering. Yet, through their collision, the
human truths that truly matter to us all, and that are our humanity,
may stand revealed” (2001, p. 175). Two words stand out in this
metaphor: “collision” and “shattering.” Both words describe actions
pertaining to the metaphysics of solids, which collide and shatter. In
the collision of the mirror and the hammer, Spinelli characterizes the
outcome to be “shattering.” From the fragments, our humanity will
stand revealed. This meeting between the self and the other (or
“intimacy” as Spinelli calls it) is marked by violence. These metaphors
also evoke “masculine” images of stability, rigidity, solidity, inertness,
stasis, and “aggressive” images of noise, and fragmentation.
Psychotherapeutic interventions that are framed in phallic terms will
have to either exclude women or subsume them.
Why not a mutual exchange that reveals the truth about sexual
difference? That would require an imaginary that is subtended by the
economy of the fluids, an economy that is in consonance with the
feminine experience of encounters. Another question worth asking in
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this context is: what kind of sex does the mirror reflect? Or better still,
does the mirror reflect any sex at all? The fragments of the mirror
shattered by the hammer will not necessarily take into account a
(sexually) different other; rather, it only reflects the image presented to
it, namely, the “other of the same.”
Irigaray (1991) describes the encounter between two sexually
different persons in amorous terms. She writes:
This autistic, egological, solitary love does not
correspond to the shared outpouring, to the loss of
boundaries which takes place for both lovers when
they cross the boundary of the skin into the
mucous membranes of the body, leaving the circle
which encloses my solitude to meet in a shared
space, a shared breath, abandoning the relatively
dry and precise outlines of each body’s solid
exterior to enter a fluid universe where the
perception of being two persons [de la dualité]
becomes indistinct, and above all, acceding to
another energy, neither that of the one nor that of
the other, but an energy produced together and as a
result of the irreducible difference of sex. (1991, p.
180)
For Irigaray, the meeting of two sexually different persons is
subtended by the metaphysics of the fluids. The loss of boundaries
does not lead to a fusion of the two or to a shattering of one or the
other.
In my concluding chapter, I will take up in detail Irigaray’s
response to the metaphysics of the solids that permeate Western
thought. I will also show why sexual difference is privileged in my
reading of Spinelli’s work. I will also discuss the problems that Spinelli
faces in his theory and practice based on his restrictive understanding
of embodiment and his use of masculine metaphors in understanding
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the construction of existential psychotherapy. I also hope to show that
by paying attention to sexual difference, Spinelli’s existential
psychotherapy can benefit from being attuned to creative possibilities
that emerge as the therapist listens to the body speaking with a
different ear. I also want to show that when the therapist can move
beyond the constrictions of a phallocentric discourse, sexual
difference as a non-phallic relation to language and body will
structure inter-subjectivity.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
I am, therefore, a political militant for the
impossible, which is not to say utopian. Rather,
I want what is yet to be as the only possibility
of a future.
- Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 10.

5.1 Sexual difference as foundational
My analysis of Spinelli’s theory and practice of existential
psychotherapy shows that he has neglected the question of sexual
difference. In this chapter I will discuss this neglect and its
implications. Subsequently, I will also use Irigaray’s insights to
respond to the issues raised in my analysis of Spinelli’s praxis. I will
discuss the possible direction that this Irigarayan critique can offer to
Spinelli’s existential therapy. Before I proceed, however, I want to
address an inevitable question: “Why privilege sexual difference when
analyzing Spinelli’s praxis? What about other differences that also
mediate man-woman relations and which he also neglects, like race,
culture, and class? What makes sexual difference different?”
Many of Irigaray’s critiques have raised questions regarding her
emphasis on sexual difference. Some of her critics point out that her
undue emphasis on sexual difference has precluded her from paying
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attention to other differences. Patricia J. Huntington (1998), for
instance, criticizes Irigaray for elevating sexual difference in her
exploration of identity. For Huntington, race, class, and other matrices
are “coextensive features of [a] symbolic reality that refer to the
tension between being and nonbeing, having and not having” (1998, p.
255). Essentially, critics argue that Irigaray privileges sexual
difference and makes other differences secondary.
Irigaray responds simply that other differences cannot be
adequately considered without confronting the questions raised by
sexual difference (and vice versa). For Irigaray, sexual difference is not
mediated by biology or some ontological difference between what
culture identifies as “man” and “woman,” but a particular relationship
to the body and language that structures inter-subjectivity. Her
understanding of sexual difference clearly does not exclude the
significance of other differences in the understanding of intersubjectivity. While she is wary of any attempts at submerging
difference to sameness, she nevertheless recognizes a lack in the area
of difference. She states, “We are still lacking a culture of betweensexes, of between-races, of between-traditions, etc” (Irigaray, 2002, p.
139). She also recognizes that sexual, class, race, or sexual identity
differences are fairly fundamental to how we are constituted as men
and women. Each one of the above issues is structured in relation to
the other. They have in their evolution been dependent on each other,
as for instance, when the issues of race intersect with the issues of
gender or class. Irigaray, however, privileges sexual difference because
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it is not displaced yet across cultures. Historically, sexual difference is
seen as more fundamental than other differences. She adds, “(B)eing
interested in it cannot, in any case, result in any privilege, but
forgetting its importance can. Because the way in which sexual
relations are organized in a society, in a culture, can create privileges”
(2000, pp. 166-167). Furthermore, Irigaray maintains that questioning
the assumptions that sustain sexual differentiation can affect all other
relations. Based on her observations of other cultures, Irigaray argues
that differences between them, for instance, “come from more or less
hierarchical treatments of the relations between genders” (2000, pp.
166-167). For example, hierarchical class relations and gender based
relations are collated in the phrases, “head of the table,” “head of the
class,” or “head of the state.” The implications of such a positioning
indicate gender-based hierarchal relations.
Irigaray further states, “The duality of the sexes cuts across all
races, all cultures, all traditions. It is therefore possible to organize a
society starting from this difference” (2002a, p. 136). She also notes
that privileging sexual difference is crucial to human relations
because “the instinct to possess the other’s body like a property”
(2000, p. 98) is universal.
If a study of sexual difference as an absence (as established in
my preceding chapters) reveals the importance of respecting others,
then this respect can be extended to other differences as well. As
Irigaray proposes, “Respect of the other gender, the most difficult kind
of respect since it leads from the most instinctive to the most spiritual,
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can bring us to respect other differences: race, generation, tradition,
language, and culture” (2000, p. 99). Irigaray observes that preserving
this respect for the sexual other is difficult because “the instinct to
possess the other’s body like a property” (2000, p. 98) continues to
subsist as a natural given in the relations between men and women.
For Irigaray, the complexity involved in the relations between man and
woman, can be a powerful guide in our efforts at learning to respect
other differences. In fact, Irigaray persistently emphasizes the
importance of sexual difference as foundational to any inquiry into
subjectivity.
My critique of Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy is limited to
showing the consequences of his occlusion of sexual difference. My
emphasis on sexual difference (as I have argued in this thesis) is
based on Irigaray’s compelling arguments. Spinelli’s existential
phenomenological psychotherapy’s occlusion of sexual difference leads
to several problems that I will now discuss.

5.2 Embodiment without sexual difference
Embodiment is a crucial concept in the existential
phenomenological psychology of Spinelli. It fuels his emphasis on
inter-subjective relations. Echoing Merleau-Ponty, Spinelli states that
the body is not a thing among other things, but exists as relatedness
to the world or as “embodied consciousness” (2001, p. 82) and
expresses “our unique dialogue with the world,” (2001, p. 82).
Spinelli’s specific understanding of embodiment can also be gleaned
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from his reliance on the existential philosopher Gabriel Marcel’s views
on how we take up our relationship to our body. According to Spinelli
(1997), Marcel posits that our bodies exist “in a ‘borderline zone’
between ‘being’ and ‘having’” (p. 187). In other words, “I cannot say
that my body is me, nor can I say that it is not me – ‘I both am and
have a body” (Spinelli, 1997, p. 187). Marcel’s assumption is that in
relation to our bodies, we exist in a ‘borderline zone’ between “being”
and “having,” irrespective of our specific morphologies. In other words,
woman is/has a body just as man is/has a body. Both MerleauPonty’s and Marcel’s conceptualizations of embodiments are what
guide Spinelli in his articulation of his clients’ “self-constructs.” My
analysis shows that Spinelli’s theory and practice ignores the sexual
specificity of the body. Nowhere in his writings does Spinelli consider
sexual difference and its implications.
From an Irigarayan perspective, ignoring sexual difference vis-àvis embodiment is problematic, “as the female and male morphologies
are the not same and it therefore follows that their way of experiencing
the sensible and of constructing the spiritual is not the same”
(Irigaray, 1996, p. 38). It is true that Spinelli does not explicitly
espouse the idea that male and female morphologies are the same. By
the same token, however, while he acknowledges that embodiment
expresses our unique dialogue with the world, he fails to hear the
sexuate nature of this dialogue. By suspending the question of sexual
difference, Spinelli implies, for example, that a woman’s relatedness to
her body is an “individual” problem unmediated by her sex. In other
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words, embodiment is simply a perceptual problem mediated at most
by one’s “self-construct.” If embodiment is merely an “individual”
problem, then its implication for therapeutic praxis is limited to a
clarification of self-constructs. What this means is that Spinelli’s
notion of embodiment can motivate the practitioner to focus only on
the role played by the “existence tensions” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 11) that
constrict embodiment, rather than on socio-cultural significations.
Spinelli’s assumption that one’s restrictive “self-construct”
(sedimentation and habituation of one’s beliefs) is responsible for the
body’s resistance to change is a simplistic understanding of
embodiment.
The following example from Spinelli’s practice regarding his
client Elizabeth’s struggle with her own relationship to her body as
she faces terminal illness (lung cancer) will illustrate his restrictive
understanding of embodiment. A few weeks into therapy, Spinelli
articulates Elizabeth’s assumptions towards her body and how they
restrict her relationships. Spinelli wonders whether she can accept an
“unconditional[ly] loving and respectful relationship” (1997, p. 291)
towards her body “regardless of whether it (her body) is deemed ‘good’
or ‘bad’” (1997, p. 291). Spinelli is alluding to the possibility of an
unconditional relationship based on her disclosure about her
experience of tending to her plants. From Elizabeth’s response to his
queries regarding her conflicted relation to her body, Spinelli surmises
that although she wishes to accept her body unconditionally and does
not see doing so as an impossibility, she feels “that there exists for her
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an obstacle within her relations with her body, with others, and with
her sense of her own being (i.e. her self-construct), that is not present
in her relationship with plants” (1997, p. 201). The “obstacle” that
Spinelli refers to with regard to her body is overlooked in his attempts
to explore Elizabeth’s “lived experience via her self-construct” (1997, p.
201). While Spinelli successfully challenges her self-construct and how
it restricts her interpersonal life, he does not explore the “lived
experience” of Elizabeth in therapy via her sexuate nature. My point is
that a change in Elizabeth’s perception of her self-construct alone
cannot account for how she takes up her own unique way “of
experiencing the sensible and constructing the spiritual” (Irigaray,
1996, p. 38). Rather, by listening with an ear for the perceptional and
sensory language of the client’s body, Spinelli and his client can allow
for creative possibilities to emerge in their encounter. Instead, Spinelli
tends to reduce the body “merely to a sociological phenomenon, the
consequences of socialization and learning” (Grosz, 1989, p. 111),
which could be explored and challenged within a respectful reciprocal
relation.
Spinelli also characterizes Elizabeth’s relation to the plants that
she tends to as “‘loving’ and ‘near-maternal’” (1997, p. 188). In
characterizing her relations as maternal, Spinelli appears to be
colluding with the phallocentric understanding of the mother as one
who is maternal and nurturing (also known as unconditional love). By
positioning her in this manner, I wonder whether Spinelli is
inadvertently creating a space for Elizabeth that allows her to give up
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being woman so that she could be maternal (and unconditional) in her
relation to her body and to others.
According to Spinelli, however, a change in self-construct is
effected when the client chooses between two attitudes, viz., “I can”
and “I must.” Briefly, the difference between the two stances are that
the former “permits openness towards one’s experience… and the
latter imposes a stance that rejects all options” (1997, p. 193). Spinelli
assumes that women and men have equal access to such stances. But
“I can” is not given the same way to men and women within the
patriarchal tradition. Openness could be understood as openness to
difference. That is, as Irigaray proposes, “This other, male or female,
should surprise us again and again, appear to us as new, very
different from what we knew or what we thought he or she should be”
(1993a, p. 74). To be surprised, and to appear and be seen as new and
different, Irigaray maintains that women should be able to have
access to a position of enunciation. Access to this position of
enunciation will help with one’s experience of the sensible and the
construction of the spiritual. Spinelli’s exclusive focus on the
exploration of the client’s self-construct prevents him from paying
attention to the sexuation of embodiment. His exclusive focus on the
self-construct restricts his own approach and precludes him from
helping the client explore her self-construct as a sexuate being. His
“interventions” fall short of giving the client access to a position of
enunciation that is in line with her sexed subjectivity.
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5.3 The use of “masculine” metaphors
In his recent work, Spinelli (2007) characterizes the inherent
tension that emerges in therapy as daimonic. He borrows this term
from the American existential psychotherapist Rollo May and tailors it
to his own purposes. Spinelli explains, “(T)he ensuing struggle
between the attempt to maintain the existing worldview and the ‘push’
to reconstitute it parallels the depersonalised (or dissociated)
possessive force of the daimonic” (2007, p. 170). Spinelli also
describes the manifestations of the daimonic in therapy as “intense
feelings that ‘spring up’ for the client in ways that may surprise,
shock, disturb, excite, repel or dismay him or her” (2007, p. 170). In
the face of such experiences, the therapist’s role, he contends is not
“to dissolve, reduce, intensify or explain these daimonic explosions”
(2007, p. 171) but “to attempt to ‘stand beside’ the client throughout
their appearance and to pursue their investigation through descriptive
clarification and challenge” (2007, p. 171).
Spinelli’s utilization of such metaphors to characterize the
process of existential therapy is problematic. Intense feelings are not
the same for men and women. In other words, the experience of the
“intense feelings that ‘spring up’” in therapy are themselves socially
constructed and so it is incorrect to assume that they are the same for
both men and women. Once again, a phenomenology of lived
experience that is not subtended by sexual difference will foreclose
important nuances and not allow the therapist to be sensitive to such
differences.
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Although this daimonic force is perceived as neutral in its
origin, its outcome (contingent upon the channeling process) can be
creative or destructive. In this sense, one of the associations evoked
through this metaphor is madness. In therapy, the task of the
existential therapist would be to “stand beside” and through
clarification and challenges sublimate this force to have creative and
healthy outcomes. Irigaray (1993c) however, cautions us about the
difference in how men and women take up their relations to madness.
She asserts:
This is in fact how the question needs to be posed.
Each sex has a relation to madness. Every desire
has a relation to madness. But it would seem that
one desire has been taken as wisdom, moderation,
truth, leaving the other sex the weight of a madness
that cannot be acknowledged or accommodated.
(1993c, p. 10)
Irigaray also uses the image of the daimonic in her articulation
of sexual difference. She characterizes the fecundity of the manwoman couple as “mediumlike, daimonic, the guarantee for all, male
and female, of the immortal becoming of the living” (1993a, p. 26).
Unlike Spinelli’s, Irigaray’s use of this term does not have explosive
and masculine qualities. In general, she characterizes the feminine
imaginary in fluid terms, as I discuss next through her image of the
“mechanics of fluids.”

5.4 Irigaray’s response
How does Irigaray respond to the problems in the theory and
practice of Spinelli’s existential phenomenological psychotherapy? As
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to the question of sexual difference, Irigaray maintains, “The natural
is at least two: male and female” (1996, p. 35), and so any attempt to
collapse this fundamental difference is to ignore reality. She insists on
maintaining this difference: not doing so would be unethical. Because
natural sexual difference is forgotten in our culture, it excludes
women at two levels: that of sex (for instance, there are few women
philosophers) and gender (for instance, when men’s ideal of success is
endorsed for women, too). Both these exclusions are facilitated by the
use of language. Given this status quo, Irigaray cautions, however,
that a simple reversal (for example, by making men marginal) is not
the solution, because “to reverse the order of things, even supposing
this to be possible, history would repeat itself in the long run” (1985b,
p. 33). She also resists the temptation to promote hierarchical
relations between men and women. She insists on the possibility of
difference without hierarchy. She is careful about repeating any
phallocratic gestures of mastery and control.
Sexual difference is the anchor point in resolving any such
problems. Sexual difference is about recognizing and maintaining the
space between the two subjects. How does Irigaray do so? She
explains:
Who or what the other is, I never know. But
the other who is forever unknowable is the one who
differs from me sexually. This feeling of surprise,
astonishment, and wonder in the face of the
unknowable ought to be returned to its locus: that
of sexual difference. The passions have either been
repressed, stifled, or reduced, or reserved for God.
Sometimes a space for wonder is left to works of art.
But it is never found to reside in this locus between
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man and woman. Into this place came attraction,
greed, possession, consummation, disgust, and so
on. But not that wonder which beholds what it sees
always as if for the first time, never taking hold of
the other as its object. It does not try to seize,
possess, or reduce this object, but leaves it
subjective, still free. (1993a, p. 13)
Irigaray marks this space of sexual difference for “wonder,” because in
wonder (as in the case of appreciating a work of art) there is no
crossing over, no consummation, or possession. This does not mean
that the relation between the two is sterile. Irigaray posits a fecund
relationship, but one characterized by creativity rather than
procreativity. From this perspective, the space between man and
woman is not crossed over even in the sexual act. Understood in this
manner, sexual difference serves as the foundation of all relations, in
which the other is an irreducible sexual other.
This space of sexual difference is also marked by a here and
now concept of time, for which Irigaray uses a theological term:
parousia. It is an “expectation of a future not only as a utopia or a
destiny but also as a here and now, the willed construction of a bridge
in the present between the past and the future” (Irigaray, 1993a, p. p.
147). Sexual difference marked by parousia is a future anterior and at
the same time a not yet. It this paradoxical or elusive quality of sexual
difference that prompts Irigaray to say, “I am therefore a political
militant for the impossible, which is not to say utopian. Rather, I want
what is yet to be as the only possibility of a future” (1996, p. 10). The
parousiac concept of temporality is not very different from the term
sensible transcendental. There is an urgency that marks the here and
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now, which does not exclude the respect and wonder for the here and
now.
Irigaray examines the assumptions underlying attempts to
create an autonomous position for women within the cultural. She
looks for construction materials that do not evoke masculine images
of rigidity, solidity, constancy and homeostasis. For instance, in one
essay, Irigaray describes feminine sexuality as subtended by an
imaginary consonant with “The ‘Mechanics’ of Fluids”:
Yet one must know how to listen otherwise
than in good form(s) to hear what it says. That it is
continuous, compressible, dilatable, viscous,
conductible, diffusible, … That it is unending,
potent and impotent owing to its resistance to the
countable; … that it mixes with bodies of a like
state, sometimes dilutes itself in them in an almost
homogenous manner, which makes the distinction
between the one and other problematical; and
furthermore that it is already diffuse ‘in itself,’
which disconcerts any attempt at static
identification. (1985b, p. 111)
Thus Irigaray shows that the “mechanics of the solids” cannot capture
the “mechanics of the fluids.” The former lacks the language to
capture the fluid-like feminine experience. Irigaray establishes the link
between the mechanics of “solids” and metaphors employed by a dry
male logic, and juxtaposes them against the “fluidity” of feminine
speech.
The formlessness of the fluid however, does not mean that it has
no form. Grosz observes, “The fluid has no given form on its own but it
can, of course, be given a form: when placed within a constricted
space, it takes on the shape of that space” (1989, p. 118). Irigaray’s
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choice of fluids over solids is underscored by her choice of metonymy
over metaphor. In a footnote in this essay, she observes that
metaphors with their reliance on “likeness” cannot do justice to the
properties of fluid, which is “neither vague nor rigorous in a geometric
way, it entails an adjustment of meaning which is far from being
accomplished” (1989, p. 110). Irigaray also cautions that the
“teleology” of the feminine experience is at stake when “every psychic
economy is organized around the phallus” (1989, p. 110), thereby
constraining the articulation of the inter-subjective experience of
women in normative heterosexual terms.
In the essay “Body Against Body: In Relation to the Mother,”
Irigaray (1993c) notes that women’s autonomous position has been
sacrificed to serve a patriarchal economy of relations. For instance, a
phenomenological analysis of women in their maternal function would
reveal that the maternal function subtends “the social order as well as
the order of desire, but it is always restricted to the dimension of
need” (1993c, p. 10-1). Irigaray asks, “What is woman, apart from her
social and material function in reproducing children, nursing,
renewing the work force?” (1993c, p. 10). Grosz’s comment on this
situation is apt:
This is not an effect of nature nor is it a social
necessity but is the result of women’s submersion
in maternity and thus her eclipse as woman. It is
an effect of a social organization which induces guilt
in those women-mothers who assert themselves as
women, as autonomous, sexual beings,
independent of the child or its father. (1989, p. 122)
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Irigaray posits that for women to be included in the cultural without
being reabsorbed by phallocentric and patriarchal categories, she has
to assert her specificity. Her ability as nurturer should transcend the
material realm. Irigaray asserts:
Our urgent task it to refuse to submit to a
desubjectivized social role, the role of mother, which
is dictated by an order subject to the division of
labor – he produces, she reproduces – that walls us
up in the ghetto of a single function. When did
society ever ask fathers to choose between being
men or citizens? We don’t have to give up being
women to be mothers. (1993c, p. 18)
As mothers within the phallocentric and patriarchal order, women are
exiled from themselves, as they unable to take up an autonomous
position.
What does Irigaray advocate in this situation? The answer is
particularly relevant to existential psychotherapy in its effort to
articulate a psychic economy in relation to one’s inter-subjective
experience.
Inter-subjective relation involves, among other things, dialogic
communication between two subjects. To have a genuine dialogue,
Irigaray suggests, we must pay attention to the subject taking up a
position of enunciation or an autonomous position in relation to
others (men and women). To accomplish this project, she calls upon
women to “invent a language,” that is in harmony with their bodies.
She avers, “If we don’t invent a language, if we don’t find our body’s
language, it will have too few gestures to accompany our story. We
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shall tire of the same ones, and leave our desires unexpressed,
unrealized” (1985b, p. 214).
The position of enunciation that Irigaray describes also needs to
encompass another important aspect of the speaking subject, namely,
the “autobiographical I.” She draws attention to this “I” in her essay
“The Three Genders” (Irigaray, 1993c). Taking her cue from
contemporary autobiographical narratives, she states, “This
transformation of the autobiographical I into a different cultural I
seems essential if we are to set up a new ethics of sexual difference”
(1993c, p. 177). A different cultural I would correspond according to
Irigaray to a subject who is not one but two, that is, a subject who is
both an “I” and a “You,” expressed in Irigaray’s writings as an “I-she”
or a “You-he” dialoguing with each other. Dialogue in the intersubjective realm that does not respect the cultural other will reduce
woman to an object status and repeat the phallocentric economy of
sameness.
By paying attention to sexual difference, can existential
psychotherapy benefit from being attuned to creative possibilities that
emerge as the therapist listens to the body speaking (both one’s own
and the client’s)? What can Irigaray offer to enhance and revitalize the
existential psychotherapy of Spinelli? I have already demonstrated
that by not paying attention to a sexually specific other and by not
paying attention to the language of the sexuate body, his therapeutic
praxis has occluded sexual difference. To liberate his praxis from
inadvertently falling prey to language that uproots the client from
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his/her own body and history, I venture to offer an alternative mode of
attending to the client as outlined by Irigaray (1993c).
In her essay, “Flesh Colors” (1993c) Irigaray attempts at
thinking through “an elaboration of sexualized subjective identity”
(1993c, p. 153) in therapy. In another essay, “Gesture in
Psychoanalysis” (1993c) Irigaray points out that the client is stuck (in
the past) when he/she is focused on “producing rational speech”
(Irigaray, 1993c, p. 93), thus remaining a prisoner of the gestures of
such a speech. I understand this production to be the restructuring of
meanings in the context of therapy, which is reminiscent of Spinelli’s
version of therapy (de-sedimenting self-constructs). Irigaray suggests
however, that we pay attention to the gestures of the body as for
instance, evidenced in “voice, with its different qualities (timbre,
intensity, pitch) and colors” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 157). She explains
that both voice and color as “two components of human identity differ
according to sex” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 157). In suggesting that the
therapist pays attention to these two components, Irigaray is offering
the therapist alternative ways to attend to sexuate embodiment that is
not in line with a phallic understanding of sexual difference. They
(voice and color) relate “to the materiality of the human body” (Miller,
2007, p. 112) and thus resist the phallic logic of sexual difference. In
the case of colors, for instance, they “do not simply obey binary
opposition or one of the principles of noncontradiction that control
every truth according to our logical systems” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 157).
As regards voice, Irigaray says that the “transitions occur almost
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imperceptibly” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 158) and that each sex, “retains a
whole range of sounds whose chords, mediants, and harmonics must
constantly be discovered or recovered as a personal balance or as a
relation to the other” (1993c, p. 158). I propose that Spinelli’s practice
of existential therapy can benefit from paying attention to the gestures
of the body (both of the client and the therapist) as indicated above,
and thus remain attuned to a non-phallic understanding of sexual
difference. If Spinelli were to incorporate this “gesture” of Irigaray into
his therapeutic praxis, his praxis can be liberated from the hold of a
phallocentric economy of inter-subjectivity.
Irigaray also observes that along with paying attention to voice
and color, therapy could be understood as painting (1993c, p. 155).
Quoting the 20th century Swiss painter Paul Klee, she states, “The
point about painting is to spatialize perception and make time
simultaneous” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 155). In its non-representational
sense, painting (described in terms of time) attempts at making past,
present, and future simultaneous. This kind of painting attempts at
an alternative understanding of time in therapy. In this sense, Irigaray
states that interpretations (in therapy) can be seen “as the ability to
compose along with the patient and to help the patient to paint: to
represent his or her perceptions and form them into a perspective in
space-time” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 155). By utilizing an understanding of
painting that is not merely representational, Irigaray challenges “the
emphasis in our culture on writing as a medium for meaning” (Miller,
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2007, p. 112) and by extension, I would add, therapy as an endeavor
in the restructuring of meanings.
I end this section with Irigaray’s thoughts on successful
analysis which could also serve as a bridge to Spinelli’s project of
existential phenomenological therapy:
A successful analysis would be the one that
successfully restores the balance and the harmony
of the perceptional economy. Pathology can often be
explained by the fact that certain past events and
affects are crystallized in the present of the subject,
and their energy is no longer available. These
residues must be brought to the patient’s
perception, they must be made fluid again, put in
perspective so that creativity can again work freely.
(Irigaray, 1993c, p. 156)

5.5 Final thoughts
My research on existential psychotherapy’s forgetting of sexual
difference has raised complex questions. Racial and cultural
differences also need to be explored in this context, as does the
implication of sexual difference for same gender (woman-woman and
man-man) psychotherapy: for instance, what is being overlooked in
the inter-subjective realm of psychotherapy between man and man
and woman and woman? What are implications for psychotherapy
when this happens?
Reading Irigaray is never easy. Her writing is complex, her style
is unique, and her ideas are provocative. I continue to find the
profundity of the simple truth of sexual difference to be challenging.
As a male researcher, I have learned from Irigaray the meaning of
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respect for women from an “inside out” perspective. I am grateful for
this opportunity. Woman as radical other is not the same kind of
human being as I am. I believe this reevaluation will serve me well,
both at a private and a professional level. Questions about women’s
subjectivity that I have explored with the help of Irigaray will remain
open-ended, keeping me poised in wonder.
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